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Abstract
The Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme is a limited recourse
financing technique. It has become popular world-wide as an
alternative approach to traditional public financing for
infrastructure development. The purpose of this thesis is to
discern critical success factors of the BOT scheme especially
in developing Asian countries.
This thesis first provides the general characteristics of BOT
in developing Asian countries, such as China, the
Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia. The backgrounds of
these countries, the objectives of BOT, the allocation of
associated risks, and the basics of financing for BOT are
described.
Second, it describes seven specific BOT projects. Four power
plant projects in China and the Philippines, and three toll
road projects in Thailand, Malaysia, China are presented.
Third, it examines the achievements of the participants'
objectives, the detailed risk allocation at each stage, and
the financial structure of BOT. The analyses discern
specific requirements for appropriate risk allocation.
Finally, it suggests several critical success factors to be
considered in future BOT projects from the points of view of
both the government and the private sector. Promoting vital
projects, establishing long term corporate strategies, using
proven technologies, and good project management as well as
having efficient turnkey contractors are the most important
tasks of the private sector.
Thesis Supervisor: Fred Moavenzadeh
Title: Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
Director, Henry L. Pierce Laboratory
George Macomber Professor of Construction Management
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Chapter I
Introduction
1.1 The background of BOT
The Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme is a limited-
recourse project financing techniquel for implementing
infrastructure development by using private funds. A project
promoter, usually an international construction contractor or
developer, builds and operates an infrastructure project for
a certain concession period, typically between 10 and 30
years, then transfers the project and the ownership at no
cost to the host country. Although similar kinds of project
financing techniques were applied in the nineteenth century
for constructing toll roads in France and Spain, and for the
famous Suez Canal in the Middle East2, the BOT scheme was
invented by Turkey's Prime Minister Turgut Ozal in early 1985
to attract foreign investment. Since he introduced BOT, it
has been utilized in several Asian developing countries for
the following reasons:
1 The limited-recourse project financing method is comparable to the
traditional non-recourse project financing method which has been used
in the oil industry. Although non-recourse project financing relies
only on the credibility of the project itself, limited-recourse
project financing relies on both the project and guarantees provided
by the host government and the sponsor companies.
2 Augenblick, Mark and B. S. Custer, The Build, Operate, and Transfer
("BOT") Approach to Infrastructure Projects in Developing Countries,
Policy Research and External Affairs Infrastructure Working Papers,
Washington, The World Bank, August 1990.
* The infrastructure crisis in ASEAN' countries
ASEAN governments, despite their countries' economic
expansion, had not considered infrastructure development a
priority. Therefore major infrastructure, including power
plants, highways, harbors, and airports, became insufficient
to sustain the continuous expansion of their economies.
Because it is very difficult to develop needed
infrastructures quickly these governments require private
participation.
* Debt crisis in developing countries and infrastructure
needs
Despite their serious infrastructure needs, developing
countries have difficulty in providing sufficient funds for
their construction because of their lack of budget and their
limited foreign debt capacity.
* Host governments' and international lending institutions'
interest in privatization
The governments of the developing countries and lending
agencies were very active in the 1980's because of the
developing countries' lack of funds on the one hand, and the
international lending agencies' appetite to create new
investment opportunities on the other.
1 ASEAN countries are Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines
1.2 The background of BOT in Asian countries
In Asian countries, the BOT scheme was initially
implemented in Hong Kong, and Australia, then in relatively
stable countries such as Malaysia because of the importance
of political stability, legal systems, and hard currency
requirements. Thereafter, the scheme began to be used in
less stable countries such as the Philippines, Thailand,
Indonesia, and China.
In order to apply the scheme successfully in such
developing countries, government and project promoters must
be very sophisticated in dealing with some of the critical
factors of BOTs. Many problems have arisen because of the
inexperience of both sectors. For example, the Second Stage
Expressway Project in Thailand was expropriated by the Thai
government, and other projects have had problems as well,
such as the poor performance of the government joint venture
partner, the delay of land acquisition, loss as a result of
currency fluctuation, construction cost overruns, delays in
construction, and poor construction quality.
1.3 Objectives
The objective of this thesis is to discern critical
success factors for future projects through intensive risk
analyses of current BOT projects in Asia. The thesis
examines problems as well as risks and their allocation in
current BOT projects. It includes an analysis of government
support and financing. In particular, it examines seven BOT
projects from the view-points of both the government and the
private sector.
1.4 Organization
In Chapter II, the thesis first provides the background
history of BOT in developing Asian countries, such as China,
the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia. It presents each
country's needs for BOT, regulatory arrangements, and current
BOT and other privatization projects. Second, it presents
the participants and their objectives and the possible
constraints of BOT. Third, a general understanding of the
associated risks and the allocation in BOT are described.
The financing basics for funding sufficient equity and debt
are then presented.
In Chapter III, seven BOT cases are described. Of the
four power plant projects described in China and the
Philippines, one in each country is under construction and
one in each country is under operation. Next, three toll
road projects in Thailand, Malaysia, and China are described.
All three projects are under construction.
In Chapter IV, the thesis first summarizes the major
project features of the cases described in Chapter III.
Next, the achievements of the objectives presented in Chapter
II are evaluated. Finally, the detailed risk allocation in
each project is examined with a comparison of all projects.
In Chapter. V, critical success factors for future BOT
projects from the points of view of both the government and
the private sectors are discussed.
Chapter II
General Characteristics of BOT
2.1 Introduction
The background histories of BOT in developing Asian
countries, such as China, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Malaysia are first provided. Second, each country's needs
for BOT, regulatory arrangements, and current BOT and other
privatization projects are presented. Third, the
participants in BOT and their objectives are described. The
main objectives of the government are the additionality and
efficiency gains from BOT. The private sectors' major
objective is a high return on their investment. Thereafter,
general understandings of the associated risks and the
allocation in BOT are described. The financing basics for
funding sufficient equity and debt are then presented.
2.2 The background of BOT in Asian countries
The background of BOT in developing Asian countries,
China, the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia is discussed.
First, Asian countries' economic growth and their current
policy toward infrastructure development are described.
Thereafter, their infrastructure needs, regulatory adjustment
toward privatization, including BOTs, and current BOT and
other privatization projects are presented.
2.2.1 Economic growth and infrastructure development
Sharp economic growth in Asian countries has expanded
the need for infrastructure far beyond that which government
can provide without increasing budget deficits or foreign
borrowing. China and ASEAN countries' GNP growth for 1990-
1994 is shown in Figure 2-1.
(Annual Percentage Rates)
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Source: Pacific Economic Outlook 1993-1994 and OECD
(1990-92: actual rates, 1993-94 forecast rates except
China government actual 1992 and estimates 1993).
Figure 2-1
China and ASEAN Countries' GNP Growth for 1990-19941
Because of their need to develop their infrastructure,
these countries have changed their policy and now cooperate
with foreign investors. Such Asian countries have even
enhanced their political, legal, and social condition to
induce foreign investment, as the infrastructure demand is
1 Heginbotham, Erland, Asia's Rising Economic Tide: Unique opportunities
for the U.S., National Planning Association, 1993.
Source: Pacific Economic Outlook 1993-1994 and OECD (1990-92: actual
rates, 1993-94 forecast rates except China government actual 1992 and
estimates 1993).
urgent, especially in the power sector in the Philippines and
China, and in the transportation sector in Thailand and
Malaysia. Therefore, BOT has become very attractive both for
these countries and for foreign investors. Each country's
specific background for privatization is described in the
following sections.
2.2.2 China
2.2.2.1 Infrastructure needs
In China, as in other Asian countries, the power and
transportation sectors are urgently in need of infrastructure
development. Since the implementation of the "Open Door"
policy, the power sector has increased its capacity quickly.
The annual added capacity has exceeded 11,000 MW since 1988.
However, the GNP has risen by 8.8% annually during the last
decade, more than the capacity growth of 7.7%. Therefore,
brownouts are still daily phenomena. China's energy planners
are going to add a total of 12,000-15,000 MW of new capacity
each year for at least the next decade, mainly in the
industrializing regions of southern and eastern China.1
2.2.2.2 Regulatory changes to promote BOT
It seems too early to predict the sustainability of the
recent Chinese policy for foreign infrastructure investors.
However, China is definitely pursuing the privatization of
power plants, roads, and other utilities. The government has
1 Gray, Frank, "Doors opened to foreign investment," Financial Times, 25
May 1993.
been modifying laws to keep up with rapid economic
development. It first decreased private business ownership
restrictions to attract foreign investors in late 1970s.
During the 1980s, joint corporations and joint ventures
between Chinese and foreigners, and wholly owned foreign
enterprises were introduced. However, such enterprises were
restricted to technology and export related sectors because
of technology transfer and the foreign currency shortage.
Also, public services such as electricity generation were
restricted to the government. In the 1990s, the government
recognized the importance of foreign capital and enabled
foreign investors to invest in such infrastructure projects.
Major preferential policies for cooperative and equity joint
venture projects include a certain amount of tax exemption
for income and the repatriation of investments; custom duty
exemptions for imported machinery, equipment, and materials;
and land use rights.
2.2.2.3 Current BOT projects
In the power sector, the Shajiao B Power Plant,
completed in 1987, is the only functioning example of the BOT
project. Shajiao C is also the only project under
construction. However, two successive projects have been
announced recently. One is Hong Kong based Cathey
International Group's joint venture project in the Shandong
province which constructs 300 MW power plants. This project,
including the renovation of two other plants will cost US$
500 million. The other project is the Colorado based Wing
Merril International's coal fired plant located in the
central Chinese province which is under negotiation for US$
2,800 million.' Between 30 to 40 more projects are planned
under the Sino-Foreign Joint Venture scheme over the next
eight years, beginning in 1994, by BOT or BOO.2
In the transportation sector, Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai
Superhighway (Phase I) is under construction, and the initial
agreement for Phase II was agreed in November, 1992. 3
In Chinese projects, Hong Kong investors have played a
very important role, accounting for 58 percent of China's
export and 42 percent of its import in 1989. Over 59 percent
of China's foreign investments from 1979 to 1989 came from or
through Hong Kong investors, making them invaluable for
Chinese projects because of their experience and connections.4
2.2.3 Philippines
2.2.3.1 Infrastructure needs
In the Philippines, the most urgently required
infrastructure is power plants for alleviating the power
shortage in Manila. Brownout in Manila occurred up to 10
hours a day in the summer and 4 hours in the fall of 1993,
and has caused more than US one billion dollars loss in
1 Goldstein, Carl, "Charged Up: Foreign firms plan Chinese power
ventures," Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 April 1993.
2 Aixung, Tan, "The Development of China's Electric Power Industry:
Opportunities and Challenges," Conference on Private power in China,
Infocast, San Francisco, Feb. 1994.
3 Goldstein, Carl, "Open Sesame: Hopewell's troubled China road nears
completion," Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 December 1993.
4 Heginbotham (1993).
production and 400,000 jobs since 1990.1 To meet this power
crisis, the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) has formed a
plan to add 20,687 MW of installed capacity between 1993 and
2005.2 In 1993, the Philippines legislature enacted "The
Electric Power Crisis Act of 1993", which gave the president
emergency power to exempt legal and administrative procedures
regarding the construction of power plants, to exclude
opposition in environmental problems, to sell national
property to construct power plants, and to change the
organization of NAPOCOR. The law is effective for two years. 3
2.2.3.2 Regulatory changes to promote BOT
In May 1987, the government established a power
developing program under Executive Order No. 215. The law
ended the National Power Corporation's monopoly and enabled
private generation in the power industry. In 1991, the
Build-Operate-Transfer Law, Republic Act No. 6957, went into
effect. The law gave authority to concerned government
agencies and relevant local government agencies to approve
projects within their jurisdictions. Although, all national
projects must be approved by Congress before the call for
bids. 4 In addition, the Philippines improved the climate for
1 Thomas, Eapen, "Manila Lightens Up," Infrastructure Finance, Fall
1993.
2 The prospectus of Consolidated Electric Power Asia Limited, 24
November, 1993.
3 Engineering Business, "Hijyoutaikenhou seiritsude chuumoku atsumeru
Philippines denryoku project," Japan, 15 May 1993.
4 East Asian Executive Reports, "Philippine BOT Law Update Implementing
Rules and Regulation for Foreign Investment Act of 1991," 15 February
1992.
foreign investment. The Foreign Investment Act of 1991
(Republic Act No. 7042) allowed foreigners to own 100% of
equity in Philippine companies, and in 1992, the Central Bank
removed restrictions on retention of foreign exchange
earnings which significantly reduced the borrowing cost of
the US dollar. More private sector involvement in the power
industry is desirable (Thomas, 1993).
2.2.3.3 Current BOT and other privatization projects
NAPOCOR is pursuing three types of privatization
structures such as BOT, Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO), and
Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer (ROT). BOT has drawn the most
attention of the three because of project financing and
NAPOCOR's particular risk allocation. Before NAPOCOR
implemented BOT, many conferences about BOTs and field trips
to US private power utilities were held by US AID to educate
NAPOCOR about the effectiveness of BOT schemes. It was, in a
sense, an advertising scheme for US firms to acquire an
advantage in the Philippines (Evans, 1992).
*BOT
A typical BOT scheme evolves as follows: NAPOCOR
supplies land and fuel to a private consortium; the private
consortium then arranges the financing; it designs, builds,
operates the plant, and after the concession period,
transfers it back to NAPOCOR at no cost. Payments for the
sponsor come in two forms': a capacity fee for the plant
investment and reasonable return, and an energy fee for the
cost of generating electricity. A certain amount of the
payments is in the foreign currency determined by the
sponsor. The reason for BOT's usage in the Philippines are
twofold. First, BOT financing is considered cheaper than
NAPOCOR's financing, as is shown in the study done by Bechtel
for the Pagbilao Project. Second, NAPOCOR's plants are
regarded less reliable than plants constructed by BOT because
of the terrible track record of NAPOCOR (Thomas, 1993).
Current BOT projects are shown in Table 2-1.
Table 2-1
BOT Projects in the Philippines'
Comuisasioning Plant Proponent Cooper- Capacity Type Fuel
ation (MW)
Period
Jan. 1991 Navotas I Hopewell 12 210 Gas Distillate
(9HongKong) Turbine
Mar. 1993 Navotas II Hopewell 12 100 Gas Distillate(HonKong) _Turbine
June 1993 Mindanao Alcantara/Tcmen - 60.5 Diesel Bunker C
DSL
Sep. 1993 Mindanao Alcantara/Tcaen - 40 Diesel Bunker C
DSL
Apr./May Batangas Enron Power 10 105 Diesel Bunker C1993 DSL (USA)
Oct. 1994 Baung First Private 12 215 Combined Bunker C
Power Co. Cycle
June 1995 Pagbilao Hopewell 25 350 Coal Coal
May 1996 (HongKong) 350
Lan. 1998 Sual Under 25 1000 Coal Coal
Solicitation
Jan. 1998 Mindanao Under 25 200 Coal Coal
Coal Solicitation
1 The author adopted the data from Thomas, Eapen, "Manila Lightens Up, "
Infrastructure Finance, Fall 1993, and Malixi, Pablo V., "The
Philippines: National Policy with Respect to Private Power Generation,
and the Co-Existence of Public and Private Power," Infocast
conference, Private Power in the Pacific Rim, Los Angeles, 25-26
January 1993.
0 BTO
The only difference between BOT and BTO is the entity
which provides the financing for the project. In the BTO
-scheme, NAPOCOR obtains a loan for project financing.
Therefore, BTO is similar to a turnkey contract with
operation and maintenance guarantees. NAPOCOR could handle
new technology with a shorter implementation period than a
traditional turnkey contract because detailed design
specifications are not necessary because of such guarantees.
NAPOCOR implemented the BTO scheme instead of BOT when it
needed urgent capacity increase because of the much shorter
implementation process. Current BTO projects are shown in
Table 2-2.
Table 2-2
BTO Projects in the Philippines'
Comiassaioning Plant Proponent Cooper- Capacity Type Fuel
ation (MW)
Period
Jan. 1993 Bataan I ABB/Marubeni/Ka 15 3*70 Cambined Banker C
SC-1-3 wasaki Cycle
Bataan I (Swiss/Japan) 1"*90
CC-4
Apr. 1993 Bataan II ABB/Marubeni/Ka 15 3*70 Cambined Banker C
SC-1-3 wasaki Cycle
May 1994 Bataan II (Swiss/Japan) 1*90
CC-4
Sep. 1993 Mindanao Tcrnen/Wartsila 10 40 Diesel Bunker C
DSL II (Japan/Finland)
Dec. 1993 Makban Onnat, Inc. 10 15.7 Geothermal -
Binary (USA)
Feb. 1994 Mindanao Mitsui/BWES 15 2*100 Diesel Bunker C
Power (Japan/Denmark)
Barges
May 1994 Bacan Omnat, Inc. 10 15.7 Geothermal
Binary (USA)
1 Malixi (1993).
• ROL
In this scheme, the sponsor rehabilitates an existing
plant, operates it, and returns it to NAPOCOR after a
specified cooperation period. The scheme consists of two
periods: the assessment period and the operation-maintenance
period. In the assessment period, the sponsor sets
performance upgrade targets for the plant to improve its
life, capacity, flexibility, and efficiency. Following the
assessment, the sponsor implements and finances the program.
The payment for the sponsor is through the capacity and
energy fees based on actual performance during the
cooperation period. Even though the scheme is in the
experimental stage, three facilities have already been
contracted (Malixi, 1993).
2.2.4 Thailand
2.2.4.1 Infrastructure needs
Thailand has been developing very quickly with its rapid
expansion of export, foreign investment, and tourism.
However, as a result of its rapid expansion, the Bangkok
metropolis has lacked the urban planning, public utilities,
and infrastructure necessary for large cities. Furthermore,
the population and transportation needs around Bangkok are
rapidly increasing. Thailand desperately needs to improve
its infrastructure for expressways, power plants,
communication systems, and sewage works to keep up with its
more than 7% economic growth. The seventh national plan
infrastructure projects table is shown below.
Table 2-3
Seventh National Plan Infrastructure Projects 1992-19961
Project Estimated Duration
cost (US$ mm)
All energy-related projects 11,071 1992-96
Bangkok 2m telephone lines 3,922 1992-96
Nong Ngu Hao International Airport 3,200 By 2000
Hopewell elevated railway (60 km) 3,137 1991-01
Provincial 1m telephone lines 1,961 1992-96
MRTA Skytrain (19 km) 1,804 By 1997
Second stage expressway (40.5 km) 1,176 1991-95
Provincial Highways 1,145 1990-95
Tanayong electric train 800 1992-96
Third stage expressway (31 km) 878 1995-00
Ekamai-Ramindra expressway (18.7 km) 412 1994-96
Dong Muang tollway 408 1991-94
Optical fibre network 373 1992-93
Thailand national satellite project 216 1993
Source: Board of Investment Review Vol. 2 No. 1
In the transportation sector, in 1972, the government
created the Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority of
Thailand (ETA), and constructed its First Stage Expressway
within the government budget in order to overcome traffic
congestion. However, as a result of ETA estimations that in
the year 2001, trips in Bangkok within the outer ring road
would grow to 29 million per day or 460,000 vehicles per peak
hour. It is plain that the government budget is
insufficient, and the ETA is now seeking foreign investors
for the following Third and Fourth Stage Expressway Systems
and other Projects.
1 Barnes, William and Victor Mallet, "Thais make a mess of their
muddling," Financial Times, 22 June 1993.
In the power sector, the power supply has always been
larger than the consumption, as is shown in Figure 2-2.
However, the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand
(EGAT) plans to more than double the capacity in ten years to
cope with the demand which will increase as a result of rapid
industrial and residential development on the Eastern
Seaboard.
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Figure 2-2
Thai's Installed Capacities and the Peak Load1
2.2.4.2 Regulatory changes to promote privatization
In the transportation sector, the Thai government seemed
to support the developers fully, having supplied subsidies
for land acquisition and having suggested several remedies in
the concession scheme. However, problems in the Second Stage
1 Ruangrong, Pallapa, "Private Power Development in Thailand," Infocast
conference, Private Power in the Pacific Rim, Los Angeles, 25-26
January 1993.
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Expressway revealed that public infrastructure development in
Thailand is especially complicated because both the military
and the civilians have interests in those projects. This is
a special risk in Thailand.1 Therefore, a solid regulatory
framework must be agreed upon to promote transportation
projects in the future.
In the power sector, three main regulatory changes have
sided progress toward privatization since 1991. The first
was the introduction of a new policy which allowed the
previously prohibited practice of private power companies to
sell electricity, a practice which had been prohibited. The
second was that the government would be permitted to purchase
power from small power producers. The third was the
commercialization of electrical utilities and the
privatization of the large power projects. Although EGAT
announced a further expansion plan, it seems that investment
may be limited because of the authority's tendency to guard
its territory jealously against privatization.2
2.2.4.3 Current BOT projects
Thailand, especially Bangkok, has been regarded as very
suitable for BOT because of fierce traffic conditions, a
strong economy, stable currency, a relatively low inflation
rate, and political stability. Therefore many project plans
are concentrated in the Bangkok metropolis.
1 Sender, Henny, "Don't Bank on it: Foreign lenders want out of Thai
highway project," Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 February 1994.
2 Ferrigno, Joseph W., "Prospects for Private participation in Asian
Infrastructure," Public Works Financing International, January 1993.
In the transportation sector, the research of the US
transportation consulting firm, Wilbur Smith Associates
(WSA), revealed that seven major public and private
transportation projects were under construction or
development, including the Second Stage Expressway (SES), the
Don Muang Tollway, and Hopewell's expressway and toll
systems. The construction of the first stage of SES was
finished, but the project has had conflicts between the
project company and the ETA, and this problem has decreased
Thailand's credit for foreign investors. Don Muang is under
construction with huge cost overruns and conflicts of
alignment at the interchanges. Hopewell has not yet
implemented construction. Because the projects are
concentrated in downtown Bangkok, WSA found physical and
commercial problems with these plans. Physically, a seven-
level interchange might rise to up to 108ft. Commercially,
because many agencies and participants are planning on
similar routes for their projects, some coordination is
required to decrease the competition.'
In the power sector, the first projects were the 1,232
MW Rayong and 600 MW Khanom gas fired combined cycle plants,
and the 700 MW Ao Phai imported-coal-fired plant. EGAT
financed the construction of the Rayong and Khanom plants and
established subsidiaries to sell shares to the public. The
1 Reina, Peter, "Bangkok exploits its Market Strengths to Attract BOT
Builders for transit," Public Works Financing International, July
1992.
plant is under consideration for the privatization method
(Pallapa, 1993).
2.2.5 Malaysia
2.2.5.1 Infrastructure needs
The Malaysian infrastructure demand has changed because
the economy has shifted from dependence on commodities and
agriculture to an emphasis on the manufacturing and
industrial sectors. This change has created more
sophisticated demands on infrastructure development. For
example, in the transportation sector, 74% of the road
network was paved by 1990. The Malaysian policy is balanced
in that it emphasizes the development of rural road and
interstate road networks.' The road sector chose BOTs both
because of high traffic growth in the 1970s and early 1980s,
and because of a lack of government funding.
2.2.5.2 Regulatory changes to promote privatization
The Malaysian privatization experience has often been
referred to as a distinguished example of privatization. The
characteristics of privatization include the introduction of
new techniques represented by BOT, the role of a strong
capital market, and the utilization of the privatization
process to promote economic equality among social and ethnic
groups. The strength of privatization in Malaysia is
1 Moggie, Datuk Leo, "Malaysia: Privatization in strategic sectors
should accelerate growth in this rapidly expending economy,"
Institutional Investor, September 1991.
generated by the government leadership in the person of the
Prime Minister, and by Malaysia's highly structured and
developed institutional capacity.' The government has amended
a number of laws which had impeded the implementation of
privatization projects, including the regulations relating to
the supply of telecommunications and electricity.
Malaysia's first privatization policy was announced in
1983 and then stated in the "Guidelines on Privatization"
published in 1985 by the Economic Planning Unit of the Prime
Minister's Department. It was followed by the government's
"Privatization Master plan" published in 1991, which had
started in 1988, funded in part by the British government,
and conducted by an international consortium of bankers,
lawyers, and accountants. The policy included the
"Privatization Action Plan" which specified the following
five objectives:
* To relieve the financial and administrative burden of
government;
* To improve efficiency and productivity;
* To facilitate economic growth;
* To reduce the size and presence of the public sector
in the economy;
* To contribute to national economic policy targets
In order to achieve these objectives, the government
encouraged private sector involvement through:
1 Hensley, Matthew L. and Edward P. White, "The Privatization Experience
in Malaysia: Integrating Build-Operate-Own and Build-Operate-Transfer
Techniques within the National Privatization Strategy," The Columbia
Journal of World Business, Spring 1993.
* Sale of assets
* Lease of assets
* Management contract
* BOT, BOT, BOOT concepts
2.2.5.3 Current BOT projects
Before the establishment of the Electricity Supply Act
in 1990, the government indicated that it would consider BOT
proposals for airports, free trade zones, most forms of rail
and road projects, inter-modal and multi-modal transport
schemes, and water supply and waste water treatment
facilities. Therefore, most of the BOT projects were roads
and water supply projects as is shown in Table 2-4.
Table 2-4
BOT Projects in Malaysial
Project Name Year Sector Value of
commissi- Contract
oned M$ mm)
Kuching Interchange 1987 Roads 86.0
North Klang Bypass 1987 Roads 20.5
Kuara Lumpur Interchange 1987 Roads 300.0
Lubuan Water Supply 1988 Water 126.5
North-South Highway 1988 Roads 4,300.0
Larut Matang Water Supply 1989" Water 339.0
Ipoh Water Supply 1989 water 308.0
Labuan-Beaufort Interconnection 1989 Roads 80.0
Garbage Disposal 1990 Services 50.0
In the power sector, the power demand growth and its
forecast are shown in the Table 2-5.
1 Adam, Christopher et al., Adjusting privatization: case studies from
developing countries, Ian Randle, London, 1992.
Table 2-5
Power Demand Growth and Forecast of Malaysial
Year Growth
1980s increased
steadily
1990 14.07
1991 12.90
1992 14.77
1990-1995* 12.4
1995-2000* 9.4
2000-2005* 9.2
* Demand forecast
In order to meet the demand, Tenaga Nasional Berhad
(TNB) will develop a generation capacity of 3200 MW between
1993 and 1996, and 4500 MW between 1996 and the year 2000.
When TNB went public in May, 1992 with an offering of its
shares, the offering was oversubscribed. TNB is still
organizing regulatory, competitive, and institutional
frameworks for the realization of private power plants which
will sell their electricity to TNB.
2.3 Participants of BOT
A BOT project can include 15 or 20 parties. However,
the major outlines of the project structure are usually
negotiated and constructed among the host government, project
1 Sukro, Pian bin, "Malaysia National Policy with Respect to Private
Power Generation, and the Co-Existence of Public and Private Power,"
Infocast conference, Private power in the Pacific Rim, Los Angeles,
25-26 January 1993.
sponsor, and lenders. 1 The typical project structure of power
projects is shown in Figure 2-3.
Power Fuel Construction Suppliers Operator
Purchaser Supplier Contractor
Figure 2-3
Typical Project Structure in Power Projects
2.3.1 The host government
The host government's role in BOT is very important
because a project requires not only numerous host government
approvals, licenses, concessions and permission for
construction but also guarantees which support the project.
A government's strong commitment to a project and its ability
to cooperate with private sectors are considered critical
factors for a successful BOT project.
2.3.2 Project sponsor
A project sponsor usually establishes a new company to
1 Wigmore, Cary S., "Risk management: The legal and Insurance
perspective," Infocast conference, Private power in the Pacific Rim,
Los Angeles, 25-26 January 1993.
pursue each specific project. In general, project sponsors,
(in other words, equity participants) are developers,
contractors, operators, major machinery and equipment
suppliers, raw material suppliers, and other investors who
are seeking high rates of return from their projects.
Because of the number of participants and complicated
procedures, BOT promotion is costly and requires patience.'
Strong leadership and unity of the sponsor companies are
therefore necessary.
2.3.3 Lenders
Senior lenders, mainly international and local
commercial banks, from a large syndication under one or two
leading banks, and lend to the sponsor through it.
Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) such as the Export Import
Bank of the United States (USEXIM), the Export Import Bank of
Japan (JEXIM), the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI), and the Multilateral Agencies (MLAs) such as
the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC),
the Multilateral Insurance Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the
Asian Development Bank (ADB) sometimes participate in BOT
projects either as lenders, guarantors, or equity
participants.
1 The Bechtel group, for example, spent some US$ 7 million over nearly 5
years on an unsuccessful power plant project in Turkey, and Kumagai
Gumi reportedly spent US$ 5 million in pre-signing costs on a road
project in Thailand (Augenblick and Custer, 1990). Also Hopewell
spent HK$ 10 million in preparing an unsuccessful Hong Kong air port
study.
2.3.4 Contractor
Construction contractors often take leadership in
promoting BOT projects. They are usually reliable
international contractors, and have the ability to deal with
turnkey fixed price contracts.
2.3.5 Operator
The operators operate and maintain a project during the
concession period. Therefore, a certain performance level is
required to produce the maximum potential of the facility.
With regard to the power project, experienced U.S. and U.K.
utilities have often been selected as operators to improve
plant efficiency as a result of in reaction to the reduced
growth in their home countries (Wigmore, 1993).
2.3.6 Suppliers
Large machinery and equipment companies sometimes become
equity participants mainly of their need to sell their
products. However, in many cases, such major companies are
highly experienced in similar kinds of projects in their
local area. Therefore, equity participation could be
beneficial for the sponsors.
2.3.7 Other participants
In addition to the major participants, others are
included, depending on the type of the project. In power
plant projects, the fuel supplier and power purchaser's roles
are very important for generating consistent electricity and
assuring expected earnings.
2.4 Objectives of BOT participants
This section summarizes the objectives of BOT
participants, including both the public and the private
sectors. Public objectives can be broken down into seven
factors. Among them, additionality and efficiency gains are
the major objectives. Private sectors' major objectives are
considered to be a high rate of return and the utilization of
new investment opportunity.
However, a monopoly on the part of the private sectors
and the public sector's resulting loss of control might cause
problems. Each factor is summarized as follows:
2.4.1 Objectives of public sectors
2.4.1.1 Additionality
Additionality is a net increase in investment resources
made available to the economy as a result of the private
investment infrastructure.1 When a government lacks funds or
the bond capacity required to implement a project, it can
minimize the impact on its capital budget by using BOT as an
additional source. Because of additionality a government can
also sometimes implement other infrastructure projects that
cannot be done by BOT.
1 Israel, Arturo, "Issues for Infrastructure Management in the 1990s,"
The World Bank Discussion Papers 171, Washington, D. C., 1992.
Even though the amount of additionality is not clear,
the foreign equity portion of the financing is obviously
additional because it will not be utilized by the government
without the BOT scheme (Israel, 1992). Foreign debt
financing is the same as foreign equity investment if the
debt providers are unwilling to lend the funds to the
government without some security packages in the BOT scheme.
Historically, several countries that frequently used
BOT, such as Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, and the Philippines,
pointed out "additionality" as the prime reason for their
interest (Augenblick and Custer, 1990).
2.4.1.2 Efficiency gains
Efficiency gains can be realized not only by cost
reduction in construction and operation but also by market
sensitive, cost conscious management (Israel, 1992).
Construction cost reduction
Regarding BOT projects, cost reduction seems more
possible when competitive bidding is used. However,
competitive bidding is difficult because the real
competition begins at a very early stage when the project
is proposed by some sponsor company. As a result, in many
cases, the company which made the proposal in the first
place has already been awarded the project. This was true
in the case of the Sydney Harbor Tunnel, Hong Kong Eastern
Harbor Crossing, the Navotas Power Plant, and the Pagbilao
Power Plant.
Moreover, there are many additional premium costs which
run counter to cost reduction in BOT projects, such as the
use of turnkey contracts and some risk hedging. Therefore,
it is difficult to predict the possibility of efficiency
gains by construction cost reduction.
Operation cost reduction
Operation cost reduction will be realized by the private
sector if the operator has sufficient incentives to improve
its performance. Therefore, performance bonuses and
adequate penalties should be used for cost reduction. In
addition, from the public point of view, operation cost
reduction can be realized by a cut in public administrative
expenses.
Management improvement
In developing countries, even though the introduction of
BOT does not reduce costs extensively, the efficiency
gained by management improvement through utilizing private
foreign companies will be substantial. The public sector
will have an opportunity to learn updated management
methods throughout the construction and operation period.
The efficiency gain, in this case, will be realized by the
quality and service improvement. However, the existence of
inappropriate government policies, a weak regulatory
system, and ineffective institutional arrangements will
hamper improvement.
* In the case of private power companies
The efficiency of private power companies as compared to
public utilities has been researched, mostly on the basis
of US cases. Donahue (1989)1, summarized past research
results, which are shown in Table 2-6, and concluded that
there was no evidence of superiority of private companies
in their efficiency from the view point of the cost
reduction.
Table 2-6
Electric Utility Cost Studies
Study Conclusion
Meyer, 1975 Public more efficient
Yonker, 1975 No significant difference
Neuberg, 1977 Public more efficient
Pescatriee and Public more efficient
Trapani, 1980
Fare, Grosskopf, No significant difference
and Logan, 1985
Atkinson and No significant difference
Harvorsen, 1986
He pointed out that low efficiency in the private
sectors was caused by the rate of return regulation.
Regulators normally set a minimum rate which will allow the
smallest possible profit for the private utilities.
1 Donahue, John D., The privatization decision: public ends, private
means, Basic Books, 1989.
Consequently, private utilities lose their incentive to
pursue profitability and, at the same time, they cannot
invest in large efficient facilities because of the
suspicion of the public sectors. He pointed out other
difficulties private utilities have in generating
incentives to pursue efficiency gains, including the
complexity of contractual relationships with many
participants such as utility managers, investors,
regulators, and consumers.
* In the case of a toll road
In the study of Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1993)1, the only
limited efficiency enhancement (cost reduction) of private
roads was presented in the cases of France and Spain. In
only one case, a French private toll road company, was
there a reduction of 23 % of construction costs along with
an increase in the productivity of labor and equipment.
Some of the reasons for limited efficiency improvement in
these cases were the government's lack of encouragement,
and the private sectors' lack of incentives to economize
construction costs since their construction fees were
generally proportional to the monetary scale of the
project.
In the operation phase, an efficiency gain by the
private sector becomes plausible with the enhancement of
the learning curve and scale or scope economies,
1 Gomez-Ibanez, Jose A. and John R. Meyer, Going Private, The Brookings
Institution, Washington, D.C., 1993.
especially, when an experienced world wide operator is
available.
In addition, If contractors and financiers cannot be
changed whether the owner is public or private because of
the large project size, the project cost reduction will be
restricted and, as a result, a major change of efficiency
by cost reduction won't be expected.
2.4.1.3 Government risk reduction
Some of the traditional government risks are reduced by
transferring the risks to the BOT sponsor and financiers.
However, governments are usually required to support the BOT
sponsors and lenders by providing some guarantees that the
private sector cannot provide.
2.4.1.4 Positive externalities
The successful adoption of BOT will create positive
externalities. For example, the local capital market may be
created or strengthened by foreign investors, and other
investment climates may be improved by the reputation of
success. In the long run, if the successful BOT improves the
condition of the country's infrastructure, it may bring the
possibility of further economic expansion. In addition,
governments can create a long term source of income either by
capturing the increased value of adjacent land or by
developing the adjacent land of the project.'
1 Stainback, John P., "Privatization Is the Answer, but There Is No Free
Lunch," Real Estate Finance, Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 1990.
2.4.1.5 Technology transfer
In developing countries, technology transfer is used to
the government's benefit. In BOT schemes, foreign
contractors and operators must pursue projects efficiently.
In order to do so they must rely on efficient technology,
rather than state of art technology to maximize the project's
productivity. In this way, developing countries will be able
to acquire technology and their workers will have the chance
to improve their skills in the field. Technology transfer in
BOT schemes takes place both during construction and during
long operation phases.
2.4.1.6 Political environment enhancement
In the case that tax payers are sensitive to tax
increases for providing public works financing, BOT can be an
effective source for governments so they can provide needed
projects without losing the political support of the
citizens.
2.4.1.7 Rapidity of development
Sometimes the government can progress with a project
more quickly by using the BOT scheme. For example, the
Navotas Power Plant in the Philippines developed quickly with
the strong support of the government. If the project is
really needed and encouraged by the government, the BOT
scheme will accelerate its progress effectively.
2.4.2 Objectives of sponsors
2.4.2.1 High return on investment
Realizing a high return on their investment is the major
motivation for sponsors. A certain level of profitability,
if possible higher than that of their domestic market, must
be assured to proceed with BOT projects in developing
countries.
2.4.2.2 Project finance
Limited or non-recourse project financing used in BOT
schemes is attractive to sponsors, because by using project
financing, the sponsors can raise funds based not on their
balance sheet but on the project's assets.
2.4.2.3 The cycle of construction demand
BOT sponsors are usually led by larg6 construction
contractors that have projects world wide. These contractors
have to reserve a certain number of contracts to maximize
their employees' productivity. Therefore, when the domestic
demand is high, their incentives usually decrease toward
risky projects like BOTs. Conversely, when the domestic
demand is small, they tend to take risks on BOT projects.
This tendency might be strong in Japanese contractors because
of their life-long employment system.
2.4.3 Objectives of Lenders
Lenders seek a high return on investment with guarantees
provided by sponsors, host governments, multilateral
agencies, and other agencies. International lenders'
participation depends on their domestic economic environment.
2.4.4 Constraints of BOT
2.4.4.1 Possible monopoly
From a governmental point of view, consumers must be
protected from monopoly abuse by private sectors by the
creation of regulatory systems. Regulatory systems require
transparency in transactions, the lifting of any
inappropriate regulations, and price controls. "Successful
privatization of natural monopolies in lower income countries
requires regulatory framework that separates out potentially
competitive activities, establishes the tariff regime,
clarifies service goals, develops cost minimization targets,
and creates or strengthens an agency to supervise the
process."l In BOT projects, monopoly abuse could occur.
However, it can be eliminated by using an appropriate rate of
return regulation with incentive fees.
the case of private power
In the past, private power was regulated in some
countries and not regulated in others. Electricidad de
Caracas, the private power company in Caracas in Venezuela,
1 Kikeri, Sunita and et al., Privatization, The Lessons of Experience,
The World Bank, 1992.
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is an example of a private power company extremely well run
without regulations. For many years, despite the
government's urging to raise the rates for tax revenue
purposes, the company not only refused to do so but even
supplied electricity for poor people with concessional
rates.1 On the other hand, some electrical companies in
Latin America can be seen as examples of problematic
private power companies with low earnings and poor service
because of regulations. 2 The fact that unregulated private
power service is superior suggests the difficulty of
control with regulation. In developing countries, private
power is more prevalent in isolated areas, despite the
possible abuse of monopoly power (Roth, 1988). As a
result, consumers facing monopoly suppliers could have
serious problems. Therefore, extremely careful regulatory
systems are required for private power projects.
the case of toll road
Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1993) pointed out that
surprisingly little controversy has arisen over the
potential problem of monopoly or market cc "-- In
their cases, the profitability is regulat
allowance of rate of return on investment
ambiguous toll rate. In California's ca
1 Ruhl, Juan, Ricardo Zuloaqa 1867-1932, Caracas
de Caracas, 1978.
2 Roth, Gabriel, The Private Provision of Public
Countries, Oxford University Press, 1988.
rate is set and a private sponsor can manage the toll rate
within the ceiling rate.. This approach is acceptable to
private investors and probably has a lot of advantages,
although it is difficult to set the rate. However, in
California, even though the earnings exceed the set return,
up to 6 % incentive returns above their allowed rate are
applied to the project if it meets certain public
objectives.
2.4.4.2 Loss of control
Clifford Chance (1991) describes government concern over
losing control in the following points:1
- service quality throughout the term of concession
- safety and environmental protection standards
- charges levied upon consumers
- maintenance and repair works carried out in order to
provide an adequate service
In order not to lose control, the government should set
up a precise regulatory framework.
2.5 Risks and governmental supports in BOT
In BOT projects such as toll roads and power plants,
various kinds of risks are associated with each stage of the
project. BOT sponsors are required to have skills which will
allow them to identify the risks and allocate them to the
most appropriate participants, so that they can be dealt with
1 Clifford Chance, Project Finance, 1991.
as efficiently as possible. These skills are critical
because, as Beidleman (1990) said, "Only around 20 % of the
projects that are seriously considered are successfully
completed. The causes of this high failure rate are delays
in adoption and completion, technical failure, poor
management, and legislative or regulatory changes. The key
to accurate forecasting and successful project finance is to
identify and manage these risks."' The risks referred to are
either country specific risks or project oriented risks.
In BOT's risk allocation, the governmental role is much
larger than in general project financing because BOT projects
are usually infrastructure projects which were traditionally
created by governments. Because of the nature of the
infrastructure, nothing can be done by the private sector
alone.
2.5.1 Country risks
Each country has a different political background, legal
system, culture, and language. Therefore, it is very
important to assess the unique risks which are affiliated
with the project. Although country risks can be assessed by
such experts as credit rating agencies and magazines, it is
very difficult to evaluate the risks appropriately,
especially in developing countries. For example, "Standard &
Poors Corp. placed Thailand on its "credit watch" list just
after the riot in May 1992, but it did not reduce Thailand's
1 Beidleman, Carl R. and et al., "On Allocating Risk: The Essence of
Project Finance," Sloan Management Review, Spring 1990.
A- long-term debt rating and A-1 commercial paper rating."'
Even so, the Thai government expropriated the Second Stage
Expressway Project in August 1993. Specialized advisors
familiar to the region may be helpful in analyzing the
country's risks. The World Bank's Enhanced Co-financing
Operation (ECO), which guarantees the obligation between
government and project sponsor company, might also be helpful
to reduce the risks. It is used in Pakistan's Hub River
build-own-operate power generating project. Kappaz and
Menendez (1992) said the ECO guarantee allowed the project to
structure US$ 360 million of commercial bank financing even
though no more than US$ 100 million could be raised with the
Pakistan government guarantee. '"2
Political risks
Political risks affect all aspects of a project through
site selection, construction, operation, and transfer.
Political risks include not only expropriation or seizure of
the project by the government but also more subtle methods by
which a government can take over control,3 such as making
changes in tax laws, environmental regulation, and
legislative procedures. In reality, political risk
protection is too difficult to be handled by the private
sector. Therefore, in many instances, political risks are
assumed by the sponsor's own export credit agency such as the
1 Corben, Ron, "The Stakes are High," Infrastructure Finance, Fall 1992.
2 Kappaz, Michael H. and Adolfo Menendez, "Wading Through the Hub
River," Infrastructure Finance, Summer 1992.
3 Nevitt, Peter K., Project Financing, Euromoney, 1983.
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), or some international
insurance agency such as the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA). MIGA insures US$ 50 million maximum
limit per project per coverage. In Fiscal Year 1992, it
insured US$ 313 million for 21 projects.1
* Legal risks
An established legal system is desirable for BOT
because of the complications of the scheme itself, the large
number of participants, and the contractual complexities.
However, in developing countries the legal system is usually
immature, unclear, and slow. In this case, political support
for accelerating the complicated processes of regulatory and
administrative issues must be provided by the government in
order to make projects feasible. The Philippines
government's Electric Power Act of 19932 is an example of
government support to pursue needs of electricity. In
addition, knowledgeable local legal advisors and local joint
venture partners are helpful to enforce legal procedures
quickly.
Transparency in the legal system is important throughout
the project because without transparency, foreign sponsors
can easily be face with misunderstandings and suspicion.
Such misunderstandings, for example, led to the project
1 Millian, Martine and Gregory Millian, "The New Politics,"
Infrastructure Finance, Spring 1993.
2 The Philippines congress granted President Ramos the emergency power
in April 1993 to enter into negotiate contracts for construction,
repair, rehabilitation, improvement or maintenance of power plants.
abandonment of Cogentrix's Batangas power plant in the
Philippines.1
Furthermore, governmental policy in supporting BOT must
be consistent through all levels of government agencies.
Wigmore (1993) says "if a government's ministry of finance or
national development agency endorses the concept of private
power generation, but the state-run utility refuses to pay
tariff rates that allow full recovery of cost, or government-
run fuel suppliers cannot guarantee the project owner a
reliable supply of fuel on a long term basis, then projects
will not prove financeable, despite the commitment of key
elements of the national government."
Import restrictions and import tariffs might be
eliminated by the government. In power plant projects,
machinery and equipment are usually imported, and spare parts
should be imported during the long concession period.
Therefore a waiver of import tariffs and administrative
procedure would eliminate costly delays, thus creating
another incentive to private sectors for BOT projects.
In terms of tax related support, Augenblick and Custer
(1990) summarize the standard features of special regimes for
BOT projects as:
" Waiver of local income tax during concession period
* Waiver of any withholding tax or interest and
dividends paid to foreign investors
1 Evans, Peter C., Opening Electric Power Generation to the Private
Sector in the Philippines: Policy Origins and Early Experience, Master
thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 1991.
* Reduction or elimination of local income tax on the
salaries of expatriate personnel staff
They explain, however, that when foreign investors
considers local taxes as part of overall costs, such taxes
are recoverable one way or another.
• Force majeure risk
Force majeure risks are the types of risks that are
beyond control of the participants of the project. The risks
include both insurable events such as fire, flood,
earthquake, and other events which may be insured or covered
by the government, such as wars, civil disturbances,
expropriations, and political interferences. A certain
amount of a government support is required to allocate these
risks appropriately.
* Cultural and language risks
Cultural and language differences should be well
understood. It is strategically important to be familiar
with the country's culture and language especially in Asian
countries because these countries emphasize personal
relationships and connections. Local advisors, and joint
venture partners will be helpful in mitigating cultural and
language barriers.
2.5.2 Project risks
During the entire project, the proportion and variety of
project risks change in sequence. These risks can be
evaluated in three different phases: development,
construction, and operation. Furthermore, these risks in
development and construction phases are generally larger than
those of operation phases, because infrastructure projects
are capital oriented and much ambiguity exists in the early
phases of BOT projects. Risk phases and periodical changes
of risk amount in a sample of BOT project financing is shown
in Figure 2-4.
Cost $
(millions)
1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 19 20
Engineering and --- + 4--Start-up Phase-- 4 ----- Operations Phase------Construction Phase
Figure 2-4
Risk Phases in a Project Financing (Nevitt, 1983)
Development phase
A development phase is very important because all of the
risks perceived in the entire project will be evaluated and
allocated in this phase. Furthermore, in this phase the
private sector must become familiar with the public sector's
institutional and organizational responsibilities and power
relationships in order to assure the smooth progress of the
project; this is the key to successful progress for
complicated BOT schemes. Meanwhile, clear cut
responsibilities and harmonious relationships should be
established among the private partners during this phase.
Technical risk
The greatest technical risk in the development phase is
design default caused by a lack of data. Subsurface
conditions should be examined as much as possible in the
early stages. Even though engineers are aware of the
importance of investigating subsurface conditions, this is
easily postponed because of the difficulty in proceeding with
an investigation before contracting. If technically unclear
points remain in the development phase, they should be
studied by professionals, and adequate reserves and back up
equity should be allocated for them.
* Bid risk
Even with the bidder's full commitment, they might fail
the bid. This risk is difficult to eliminate in competitive
bidding. Financial advisors who work with success fee bases
and are familiar to the local environment, might be helpful.
* Sponsor's credit risk
The credit of the sponsor company affects the
attractiveness of the project to investors. Therefore
sponsor companies can ask credit agencies for an evaluation.
Letters of credit issued by merchant banks also enhance the
sponsor's credit.
Construction phase
Once.construction begins, sponsor's and lenders' risks
increase quickly through the capital expenditure of the
project.
* Environmental risk
Environment problems can cause a project to be abandoned
not only before construction begins but during the concession
period as well. The environmental review process is
extremely important both in developed and in developing
countries. For example, serious environmental problem arose
concerning the Aliga Coal Fire Power Plant Project in Turkey,
which was suspended for environmental and political reasons
after the sponsor was awarded the contract. The local
residents, stirred up by an opposition political party
against BOT, went to court and had the project suspended for
two reasons. They insisted that an environmental assessment
should be made before the project was implemented, even
though such an assessment had not been required and the plant
design had fulfilled all its obligations. The residents'
second reason fro stopping constructions was the conflict in
land acquisition procedure in the specified Free Trade Zone.
Completion risk
Once construction begins, most of the expected risks are
shifted from the sponsor to the construction contractors.
The turnkey construction contract has been used many times to
protect a project from delay and cost overrun. Also,
performance bonds provided by contractors cover completion
risks. It is important to select contractors from well
known, experienced, and skillful companies. Familiarity in
the country and area is also important. Performance
incentives for the contractor are effective in getting the
project finished on time.
* Cost overrun risk
Cost overruns can occur as a result of a price change in
transportation, energy, machinery, equipment, raw materials,
and labor. This risk will be assumed by the turnkey
contractors if their contract does not include escalation
clauses. Otherwise it is addressed to a contingency or price
escalation clause in off take contracts.
* Contractor's performance risk
With reference to power plant construction, for example,
plant performance deficiency might occur as a result of
designers' or contractors' mistakes throughout the plant
construction. Therefore performance guarantees from
contractors are desirable to cover this risk. Large
machinery and equipment suppliers usually guarantee their own
products. Strategic alliances with reputable firms are very
important in eliminating this costly risk.
Operating phase
* Liability risks
Liability risks vary greatly depending on the type and
the size of the projects. For instance, because of the size
and high accident rate of highway projects, liability
insurances do not cover their liability risks. Therefore, a
shift of the burden to the public is logical. To cope with
this problem, the AB 680 toll road in California incorporates
a Build-Transfer-Operate solution.'
* Cash flow risks
During a long concession period, a project's cash flow
will be different from its original cash flow projections
because the original cash flow includes much uncertainty
about the revenue stream. Part of the uncertainty originates
within the public sector because cash flow risk is linked to
other risks such as political risk, currency exchange rate
risk, and force majeure risk, which are uncontrollable by the
private sector. Therefore public support is essential in
1 Feldman, Roger D. and Bonnie S. Temple, "New Opportunities for Banks
in Infrastructure Finance" The Bankers Magazine, July/August 1991.
order to make the BOT projects feasible to the private
sector, and it is reasonable to expect this support because
any infrastructure is originally a public good. In
developing countries, government support is vital for private
sectors because of unstable local political and legal
conditions. Finally, Gold (1992) described that "If the
public sector wants to encourage private investment, it
should not have the ability to arbitrarily influence the
financial rate of return of the private developer."'  Public
support can be considered in two ways: financial support and
non financial support.
(1) Financial government support
Financial support is necessary when the future return on
the project is uncertain. This support is either a
guarantee of certain returns or of traffic volume.
Guarantee of certain returns
Take or pay agreement -- This agreement guarantees
the particular payment level for the product whether or
not the product is purchased. It is often used for
power plant electricity purchase agreements. Moreover,
a power purchase agreement should be guaranteed by a
government when the power purchaser's credit is low.
Put or pay contract -- Medium to long-term supply
contract such as oil purchase agreement.
1 Gold, Barry P., "Competition on the Highway," Infrastructure Finance,
Summer 1992.
* Guarantee of a certain traffic volume or of a shortfall
in investor return
Through put agreement (tolling agreement) -- This
agreement guarantees a certain payment level for the
service whether or not the service is used.
(2) Non financial government support
Non financial support, mainly a government's
cooperation, is as important as financial support.
* Crippling with the creation of a similar public project
This is a guarantee from the public sector not to
construct similar competitive types of projects for a
certain length of time. In the Eurotunnel project, a "No
second facility" guarantee was granted by the government.'
* Right-of-way and air right endorsement for the private
sector
In California's AB 680 toll road, the right to use air
space will be effectively used as non financial support by
the public sector. The risk of inadequate toll revenues is
best addressed by providing other potential revenue sources
that can be pledged to support highway financing. For
example, the public sector provides the opportunity to
lease rights-of-way for a nominal rental during the
1 Tiong, Robert L. K., "Comparative Study of BOT Project," Journal of
Management in Engineering, Vol. 6, No. 1, January 1990.
franchise term. This airspace can be developed with
service stations, restaurants, hotels, and offices and be
put to other commercial uses. In addition, it may be
possible to capture some of the increase in the value of
other properties located near the highway (Gold, 1992).
The same concept was used in the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai
Superhighway Project in China.
Currency risk
In an international project, the fluctuation of the
foreign exchange rate will directly affect the projects'
revenue if the revenue is paid in the local currency.
Therefore, the best way is to earn the profit in hard
currency. However, this is sometimes difficult when the
revenue is coming from the users in the country. Another way
to avoid currency risk is to make a government agreement for
a certain exchange rate guarantee. Finally, Beidleman (1990)
said, ".. it is appropriate to hedge with either a series of
long date forward currency contracts or else a currency swap
to mitigate the currency risk."
* Interest rate risk
Abrupt changes of interest rates can seriously affect
the cash flow of the project. Beidleman (1990) said that the
interest rate risk of borrowers and lenders who use
contractually determined or fixed income securities could be
reduced by using Coupon Swaps.l
Operator's performance risk
The operating company must be selected from well
experienced companies to eliminate this risk. Performance
guarantees by the operator will be usually required by
lenders. The operator must collaborate with the contractor
during the start-up and testing phase to eliminate operating
problems
Operation cost overrun risk
A qualified operating company must be selected to
eliminate this risk. However, if a cost overrun is caused by
an unexpected reason, it can be addressed to the price
escalation clause.
2.6 Financial structure
Because BOT financing is based on the economics of the
project cash flow, it must have sufficient equity or quasi
equity provided by the sponsors. If sufficient equity is not
available a loan should be provided by commercial banks,
international financial institutions, and bilateral
government lenders.
1 "A coupon swap is an exchange of one coupon or interest payment for
another that has a different configuration but the same principal
amount" (Beidleman 1990).
2.6.1 Equity
The sponsor companies' equity participation is very
important not only for the host government but also for other
-investors because their participation is understood as a
commitment to the project. Furthermore, if the interest rate
soars or the revenues drop during the life of a project, this
equity can be the projects security against financial
trouble.
2.6.1.1 Sources of equity
Generally, equity contributors come from several
sources:
* International and local construction contractors
• Equipment and machinery suppliers
* Raw material suppliers
* An end-user or purchaser of the output
* Multilateral agencies
* So called "mezzanine1" investors
2.6.2 Debt
Successful fund-raising in a BOT project is one of the
critical success factors through the entire project because
it is the base for determining the feasibility of the
1 Mezzanine finance is an "in-between" kind of financing. It slots
between share capital and conventional senior debt. As an in-between
financing, mezzanine finance is subordinated to senior debt but senior
to share capital (Pyle, 1992).
project. Therefore, funds should be raised by the cheap,
fixed rate, and long period finance.'
2.6.2.1 Sources of debt
Debt contributors are so diversified that their
objectives and contributions differ as to the amount and
period. Major sources are:
* Coamercial banks
Commercial banks are looking for large, highly visible
projects with strong sponsorship and government supports.
Large international banks usually provide loans through a
major syndication. Their maturities are usually between 12
to 15 years.
* Multilateral Agencies
Multilateral Agencies (MLAs) provide loans with much
longer repayment periods and lower interest rates than those
offered by commercial banks. The participation of MLAs
would significantly enhance the view of potential investors
thinking of financing such projects (Kayaloff, 1988).
However, a lengthy approval processes could delay the
project (Nevitt, 1983).
1 Pyle, Thomas H., "Salient Features of BOT Schemes Financial Aspect of
BOT Projects (in Transportation)," United Nations Center on
Transnational Corporation Roundtable Discussion of BOT and the Private
Sector Project FinancinQ for the 1990s, 25 February 1992.
The MLAs' co-financing programs can be utilized as a
source to attract commercial banks and their longer term
maturities. By participating under the umbrella of co-
financing, commercial banks can enjoy the benefits of
stronger assurance against sovereign rescheduling and the
withholding of taxes. MLAs are becoming more positive
toward the BOT scheme in developing countries. For example,
the ADB's Earman, the Senior Co-financing Officer,
indicated1 that the bank encourages developing countries to
consider the BOT/BOO approach and promised to provide
financial assistance and advice. Their participation in BOT
enhances not only the attractiveness of investment for
lenders and equity participants but also provides credit for
the project and a decrease in the interest rate of the
sponsors.
Traditionally, in Far East Asia, Japanese commercial
banks have played a major role. However, in the 1990s,
instead of adopting the positive attitude of the
multilateral agencies and international lending agencies,
they have reduced their fund limits for Asian BOT projects
due to economic depression in their domestic market.
Export Credit Agencies
Foreign export credit agencies (ECAs) such as US Exim
and Japan Exim are available as a loan source. They
1 Earman, R. N. Jr., "Public Sector Source of Financing," Infocast
conference, Private Power in the Pacific Rim, Los Angeles, 25-26
January 1993.
typically provide up to 85% of equipment cost i for as long
as 15 years. Issues like national exposure and quality of
sponsor group are ECAs' key decision factors for their
lending. Other key features in gaining acceptance of ECAs'
lending are:2
- Size of the portion to be sourced from their country
- Importance of the local contractor
- Attitude of the other agencies
- Potential involvement of official agencies such as IFC
- Unwillingness by any individual agency to be perceived as
being "behind the times"
* Vendor/Supplier credit
Large suppliers such as Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) and
General Electric (GE) can be used for some credit.
* Institutional lenders
Institutional investors such as life insurance
companies, casualty insurance companies, and pension plans
can be good sources for long term-debt after several BOT
projects have succeeded. This is because, in the United
States, the institutional debt markets have traditionally
provided long-term fixed rate funds (Nevitt, 1983).
1 Although US Exim requires sponsor at least 25% cash equity commitment
and at least US$ 50 million US content it offers financing up to 85%
of the US export value.
2 Kayaloff, Isabelle J., Export and Project Finance, Euromoney, 1988.
* Wealthy individuals
They can be a good source if BOT becomes more familiar
with them after several projects.
* Capital market
Capital markets in Asian developing countries are not
large. However, as ADB's Earman presented, it is essential
to develop the capital market for BOT's expansion because it
will depend on a great extent on the existence of strong
capital markets capable of mobilizing long term funds from
private savers. However, for the international developers,
other capital market debt can be used as in the Hopewell
case in HongKong.'
* Domestic Investors
In developing countries, the contribution to debt of
local domestic investors is smaller than that of
international investors. However, governments, banks,
companies, and some individuals can be used with local
sponsor partners.
2.6.3 Placing Debt and Equity
The debt equity ratio in a financial structure varies
1 Hopewell's subsidiary, Consolidated Electric Power Asia (CEPA), was
listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in early December 1993 with
the professed aim of building power plants across Asia. Currently it
has just a handful of plants in operation or under construction in
China and the Philippines. However, the stock issue, combined with
commitments from Hopewell, provided CEPA with more than US$ 1 billion
to invest and CEPA is considering issuing non-recourse project bonds
in the US.
depending on the project's nature; such considerations are
project type, cost, location, and condition of the project.
In the past three BOT power projects, the debt equity ratio
has varied from 13 to 1 in China's Shajiao B, 3 to 1 in the
Philippines' Navotas, and 0.6 to 1 in China's Shajiao C. In
the course of the past three years, the debt leverage ratios
for Asian projects in general and power stations in
particular have become more conservative due to the
diminishing capacities of commercial banks, especially
Japanese banks (Pyle, 1993). Sample financing structure is
shown in Figure 2-5.
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BOT Power project Sample Financial Structure1
1 Pyle (1993).
Chapter III
BOT Cases
3.1 Introduction
Four power plant projects and three toll road projects
are described. Two power plant projects, Shajiao B in China
and Navotas I in the Philippines are under operation, and
other two power plant projects, Shajiao C in China and
Pagbilao in the Philippines are under construction. The
three toll road projects, Second Stage Expressway in
Thailand, North South Highway in Malaysia, and Guangzhou-
Shenzhen-Zhuhai Superhighway in China are under construction.
These projects' organizational structures, the construction
and operation status, the risk sharing of the participants,
and the financial structures are focused upon.
3.2 Shajiao B Power Station1
3.2.1 Outline of the project
Shajiao B is located in Guangdong Province in the
People's Republic of China (PRC). This plant contains two
350 MW pulverized coal-fired generation units which commenced
operation in April, 1987. This initial Chinese BOT project
was developed by Hopewell Holdings Limited (HHL)2 which had no
1 The general description in this section is based on the prospectus of
Consolidated Electric Power Asia Limited, Tiong (1992), Pyle(1993),,
and Augenblick and Custer (1990).
2 HHL is the Hong Kong based holding company of the Hopewell Group,
which operates power generation projects, transportation
infrastructure projects, property investment and management projects.
The company was established in 1972. The Group's net profit for the
year ending 30th June, 1993 was over HK$ 2 billion.
experience with power plants, but which went into the
business as a result of their hotel project which frequently
suffered brownouts and needed a stable power supply. The
plant was developed on a BOT basis under a Joint Venture
Contract between Hopewell Power (China) Limited (HPCL)1, and
Shenzhen Energy Corporation (SEDC)2 with a 10 year cooperation
period which expires on March, 1998.
This project seemed risky due to several facts: it was
the first BOT project in China; at the time China's
relationships with the rest of the world were bad; the
project was subject to the strictures of the Coordinating
Committee for Export to Communist Area (COCOM) which severely
limited high-tech exports to Communist nations; Hopewell's
own lack of experience in power generation; the lack of
Chinese expertise on such projects; and the lack of
multinational aid.3 In spite of all these negative features,
the project was successfully constructed and is operating.
One reason for this success seems to be the willingness of
commercial banks to accept substantially greater credit risks
(Augenblick and Custer, 1990).
The construction of the plant was undertaken by a
turnkey contractor consortium headed by Mitsui. The first
unit of the plant was completed 11 months before the end of
the 33 months construction schedule specified in the Joint
Venture Contract, and a bonus of HK$ 395 million and RMB 11.6
1 A 50% associated company of Hopewell Holdings Limited
2 Formerly known as Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Development Company
3 Financial Times, "BOT: Why Shajiao B stands out from the rest," 18 May
1992.
million was earned from its early operation. The plant was
completed at a total cost of approximately HK$ 4.1 billion
(US$ 520 million) which was financed through a combination of
equity, foreign currency and RMB bank loans, supplier credits
and shareholder advances. The plant is one of the largest
operating plants in the Guangdong Province.
3.2.2 Project structure
Hopewell established the project company HPCL as is
usually done in project financing. HPCL has been managing
the project based on contracts and agreements such as a
Joint Venture Contract, a Coal Supply Agreement, and an
Offtake Agreement. The project's structure and agreements
are shown in Figure 3-1.
A: Shareholding G: Performance guaranteeB: Joint Venture Contract H: Syndicated Facilities Agreement
: Coal Supply Agreement I: Master Swap Agreement
E: Turnkey Contract
F: Insurance
Figure 3-1
Project Structure of Shajiao B
3.2.3 Construction
The contractor consortium, headed by Mitsui, completed
the plant 11 months ahead of the construction schedule, and
by virtue of the early completion, HPCL earned an extra
income of HK$ 395 million and RMB 11.6 million.
Mitsui subcontracted each portion to different companies
such as Toshiba (turbines), IHI (boilers and coal handling),
and Slipform (Civil Works) in order to hedge the unforeseen
risks in this project. Other Contractors were Costains of
the UK (Project Management), Ewbank Preece/Guangdong Electric
Power Design Institute (power station designs), British
Electricity International and Fluor Daniel (operations and
maintenance), and Brown & Root of the U.S. (technical advice
to financiers).
3.2.4 Operation
Since the commencement of Shajiao B, the quantity of
electricity purchased by SEDC has exceeded the minimum
quantity specified in the off-take contract, and the purchase
quantity has gradually increased. Operating statistics of
Shajiao B from 1990 to 1993 are summarized in Table 3-1.
Through the years 1990 to 1993, HPCL's revenues rose due
to cost reduction resulting from its staff localization
policy and a consistent increase in electricity generation.
In 1990, HPCL substantially reduced its operating cost by
replacing the expatriate personnel of Electric Power Services
Table 3-1
Operating Statistics of Shajiao B1
Six
months
Item Year ended 31st December , ended
30th
June,
1990 1991 1992 1993
Revenue of HPCL ($'000)(Note) 1,095,690 1,119,465 1,152,098 578,005
Operating expenses of HPCL
(Note)
Fuel ($'000) 302,012 308,707 286,355 119,601
Other Costs ($'000) 151,957 127,520 116,535 62,227
Profit before taxation ($000) 80,500 144,292 168,644 91,903
Taxation ($000) (9,200) (10,602) 3,189 (6,993)
Profit attributable to share 71,300 133,690 171,833 84,910
holders ($000)
Electricity generated 4,463,184 4,659,254 4,826,751 2,446,350
(megawatt hours)
Electricity sold (megawatt 4,129,861 4,313,134 4,474,156 2,271,069
hours)
Electricity sold as a
percentage of installed
capacity 67% 70% 73% 74%
Note: Revenues are paid to HPCL half in RMB and half in foreign
currency, while the majority of operating expenses of HPCL are incurred
in RMB. Depreciation of the RMB against the Hong Kong dollar (in which
HPCL's accounts are prepared) and the adjustment of the electricity
purchase price from January 1992 account for the increase in profit
margin between 1991 and 1992.
(China), a US-British joint venture company which had been
responsible for the operation and management of Shajiao B,
with trained local personnel. In 1991, HPCL replaced the
operation contract from Electric Power Services (China) with
the Guanghua Industry Import and Export Corporation. By
virtue of the revenue increase, HPCL achieved considerable
interest savings by making an early repayment of the
outstanding balance of a Hong Kong dollar credit facility
1 Source: prospectus of Consolidated Electric Power Asia Limited.
obtained in 1990 and originally scheduled to be repaid in
1994, and of the term loan borrowed in 1992 which originally
amounted to Yen 11 billion and was scheduled to be repaid by
1994.
3.2.5 Risk allocation
The project risks are allocated to each participant
through contracts and agreements, such as a Joint Venture
Contract, an Offtake Agreement, a Long Term Coal Supply
Agreement, and GITIC insurance.
3.2.5.1 Joint Venture Contract
HPCL and SEDC agreed in March, 1985 to cooperate for 10
years, from April 1988, to March 1998. At the end of the
cooperation period, HPCL must transfer the plant to SEDC in
normal and operational condition at no cost.
(1) HPCL's responsibility
* Arrange the project financing, including foreign currency
bank financing
* Construct, operate, maintain, and repair Shajiao B during
the cooperation period
(2) SEDC's responsibility
" Provide HPCL with the right to use of the site
* Apply for certain governmental approvals and exemptions.
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* Make up the purchase of electricity within three months if
the power station is unable to transmit electricity due to
transmission problems outside the power station (except
force majeure).
(3) HPCL's rights
* Owns all the facilities, machinery and equipment of
Shajiao B and operates, manages, and sells the electricity
* Owns all revenues from the power station subject to the
payment of the management fee.
3.2.5.2 Offtake Agreement
SEDC, HPCL and Citicorp International Limited signed
this Offtake Agreement in December 1985.
(1) SEDC's obligation
* Guarantee of minimum purchase quantity
SEDC purchases a minimum of 60% of the installed capacity
of the plant, at a fixed rate unit price, calculated in
RMB, in each year of the cooperation period. The unit
purchase price is the same regardless of the amount of
purchase'. If a unit is closed down for other than
permitted maintenance and repairs, the minimum quantity is
reduced based on the length of the closure unless the
closure is caused by SEDC
1 Although purchase price exceeding the minimum quantity was originally
priced lower than that of minimum purchase price1, the price was
increased to the same price for the minimum quantity from January
1992.
* Monthly offtake payment
Off-take payments are made monthly to HPCL, half in RMB and
half in foreign currencies converted from RMB at pre-
determined exchange rates'. The increased purchase in
excess of the minimum purchase amount is payable only in
RMB. In the case that the payments are denominated in
foreign currency, SEDC is solely responsible for the
difference between predetermined and actual exchange rate.
In any .other cases, HPCL and SEDC are responsible for the
difference, to be divided at 70% and 30% respectively.
However, HPCL is fully responsible for the effect the
difference may make the operation and other expenses of the
power station. For the year ended 30th June, 1993, when
the RMB devalued substantially against the Hong Kong
dollar, the loss attributable to HPCL amounted to
approximately HK$ 187 million.
* Subordinated loan to HPCL
The SEDC is obliged to make a subordinated loan to HPCL to
meet such a deficiency up to an amount of HK$ 500 million
if the revenue received by HPCL from operating Shajiao B is
insufficient for meeting certain project expenses as a
result of an event of force majeure or for any other reason
other than an act or omission by SEDC or breach by SEDC of
its obligations under the Off-take Agreement or the Coal
Supply Agreement
1 Conversions into HK$ are made at a rate of RMB 0.28:$ 1 and
conversions into Japanese Yen at a rate of Yen 91.3: RMB 1.
* Advance payment for electricity to HPCL
SEDC is obliged to reduce the shortfall of HPCL, subject to
certain limitations, by way of advanced payments for
electricity if an insufficiency of its revenue is caused by
SEDC or a breach of its obligations.
3.2.5.3 Long Term Coal Supply Agreement
This Coal Supply Agreement was signed between SEDC,- HPCL
and Citicorp International Limited in December, 1985.
(1) SEDC's obligation
* Deliver coal to HPCL at the site of Shajiao B to meet the
requirements for the operation of the plant.
The base price of the coal, payable in RMB, is fixed for
the duration of the cooperation period but subject to
adjustment depending on the quality of the coal supplied.
If SEDC is unable to supply coal and HPCL is required to
purchase coal from outside the PRC, SEDC is obliged to
provide all foreign exchange necessary for the transactions
and assist HPCL in applying for all relevant approvals and
consents and exemptions from import duties.
(2) Event of force majeure
If SEDC fails to supply coal due to an event of force
majeure affecting its principal source of coal, then for a
period equal to the lesser of the duration of such force
majeure event and two months, the increased cost of
supplying coal to Shajiao B must be borne by HPCL. If the
force majeure event continues beyond this two month period,
SEDC becomes responsible for such increased costs.
3.2.6 Insurance
The obligations of SEDC under the Offtake Contract and
Coal Supply Agreement are guaranteed by the Guangdong
International Trust and Investment Corporation (GITIC), an
institution owned by the Guangdong provincial government, for
the duration of the cooperation period. HPCL has agreed to
pay GITIC an annual fee of HK$ 20 million for providing the
guarantee.
3.2.7 Financing
The cost of Shajiao B, HK$ 4.1 billion (US$ 520 million)
was financed through a combination of foreign currency loans,
RMB bank loan, supplier credits and shareholder advances.
The issued share capital of HPCL, set up in 1985, is held by
the following entities:
Table 3-2
Share Holding of HPCL
Hopewell China Development Limited (HCDL)1(50%)
Bank of China Group Investment Limited (40%)
Kanematsu Corporation (5%)
Two Chinese state enterprises (5%)
1 A subsidiary of HHL
Foreign currency loans in the principal amount of HK$
3.3 billion were provided by a syndicate of commercial banks.
The terms and conditions of the loans are described in the
Syndicated Facilities Agreement. RMB bank loan of RMB 250
million is described in the Renminbi Loan Agreement.
3.2.7.1 Syndicated Facilities Agreement
The agreement was signed between HPCL, certain financial
institutions and Citicorp International Limited (Citicorp) as
agent of the syndication. HPCL was granted two term loan
facilities of HK$ 600 million and Yen 11 billion and a
guarantee facility of up to Yen 52 billion for the benefit of
the turnkey contractor to finance project costs.
The two loan facilities have been paid in full and the
guarantee facility has been refinanced under a Supplemental
Syndicated Facilities Agreement in July, 1987 under which
HPCL was granted a syndicated loan facility of Yen 49
billion.
Table 3-3
Original Foreign Currency Project Finance Facility
Term loans: HK$ 600 million
y 11 billion
Guarantee Facility y 52 billion
Table 3-4
Refinanced Foreign Currency Project Finance Facility
Second syndicated term loan: Y 49 billion
Interest rates 1.125% p.a. above LIBOR
Repayment 25 quarterly installments
Commencing September, 1988
3.2.7.2 Master Swap Agreement
The Master Swap Agreement was signed between Citibank
N.A., China Development Finance Company (Hong Kong) Limited,
DKB Asia Limited, Wardley Limited, The bank of Tokyo, Ltd.,
Banque Paribas (Collectively, the "Swap Counterparties"),
HPCL and Citicorp in July 1987. Under this agreement, HPCL
may enter into transactions with the Swap Counterparties for
the purpose of converting HPCL's obligations to pay interest
at a floating rate under the Facility into obligations to pay
interest at a fixed rate.
3.2.7.3 Security
Under the assignments and agreements between HPCL and
Citibank, such as an Account Assignment, a Deposit Banks'
Account Assignment, an Assignment of Insurance, an Assignment
of Project Contracts, a Fixed and Floating Charge, and a
Supplemental Security Agreement, Citibank will be entitled to
exercise its rights in the event of HPCL's default under a
Facility and Master Swap Agreement. Also, under a Charge on
Shares between the HPCL's shareholders and Citicorp, and
Supplemental Security Agreement, each of HPCL's Shareholders
has created a charge over its shares in HPCL as security of
the performance of HPCL's obligations under the Facility and
Master Swap Agreement.
3.2.7.4 Renminbi Loan Agreement
In the agreement of March, 1986 between SEDC and HPCL,
HPCL agreed to reimburse SEDC in respect to all principal and
interest payments of the loan up to RMB 250 million. The
outstanding principal is scheduled to be repaid over a period
commencing in October, 1995 and terminating in December,
1997. The interest rate is payable annually based on similar
loans published by the People's Bank of China.
3.2.7.5 Shareholder Support and Subordination Agreement
The Agreement was signed between HPCL's Shareholders,
HPCL, HHL, and Citicorp in April, 1986. The Shareholders
agreed to provide subordinated shareholders' loans of HK$ 299
million to HPCL. HPCL's shareholders have assigned all their
rights of the loans as security for the obligations of HPCL
under the Facility and the Master Swap Agreement.
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3.3 Shajiao C Power Station'
3.3.1 Outline of the project
Following the success of Shajiao B, HHL has entered upon
its second and larger BOT project called Shajiao C, which is
located slightly to the east of Shajiao B. The plant will
contain three 660 MW pulverized coal-fired generating units,
capable of producing over 17,500 million kilowatt hours of
electricity annually. This project is being developed under
a Joint Venture Agreement between Shajiao Power2 and Hopewell
Energy Limited3 (HEL), which together established Guangdong
Guanghope Power Co. Ltd. (GGPCL) for constructing, operating,
and managing the plant. This agreement provides for a 20 year
cooperation period expiring in June, 2016.
The construction of Shajiao C is being undertaken by a
turnkey contractor consortium comprised of GEC ALSTHOM of the
United Kingdom and France (GA), Slipform and CE International
China Inc. (CE) of the US. The project management is being
carried out by Hopewell Tileman Limited, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of HHL. The construction commenced in April,
1992, and upon completion, Shajiao C will be the largest
coal-fired power station in Guangdong Province. Under the
turnkey construction contract, the first unit is required to
1 The general description in this section is based on the
prospectus of Consolidated Electric Power Asia Limited, Tiong
(1992), and Pyle (1993).
2 Shajiao Power is a wholly-owned subsidiary of GGPC, which is a
state-owned company established to deal with foreign entities in
the management of power plants and transmission networks in the
Guangdong province.
3 HEL was established as a wholly-owned subsidiary of HHL for the
Shajiao C project and, it has agreed to contribute to the registered
capital of and make shareholder loans to GGPCL.
be completed in March, 1995. Also, the Joint Venture Contract
specifies that all three units are to be completed by 30th
June, 1996.
The cost of the project is expected to be US$ 1,966
million, of which US$ 375 million will be financed by equity
contributions of Shajiao Power and HEL, and another US$ 375
million will be financed by shareholder loans and the
remaining US$ 750 million will be financed by a syndication
of international commercial banks. The details of the
financial structure is shown in Table 3-5.
3.3.2 Project structure
A: Shareholding
B: Joint Venture Contract
C: Operation and Offtake Agreement
D: Turnkey Contract
E: Credit Facility Agreement
F: Guarantee of Shajiao Power's Obligation
G: Power Purchase Agreement
H: Fuel Supply Agreement
I: On-lending Agreement
Figure 3-2
Project Structure of Shajiao C
3.3.3 Risk allocation
The risks of the project are allocated through contracts
and agreements such as Joint Venture Contract, Operation and
Offtake Agreement, Power Station Development Contract,
Turnkey Contract, and several financial agreements.
3.3.3.1 Joint Venture Agreement
Shajiao Power and HEL established GGPCL for the
construction, operation and management of the Shajiao C Power
Station. During the joint venture cooperation period which
will expire 20 years after the contract completion date of
June 1996, GGPCL has the right to construct, own, operate,
and manage the power station and sell all electricity
generated.
(1) Shajiao Power's responsibility
* Provide the site for the power station
* Assist in obtaining certain preferential tax treatments,
licenses, and permits
* Assist in the purchase of local materials and install
certain equipment
(2) HEL's responsibility
* Plan, design, and construct the power station
* Arrange the project financing
* Assist GGPCL and construction consortium in the purchase
and importation of supplies and equipment
* Transfer all the remaining assets of GGPCL to Shajiao
Power at no cost upon the expiration of the cooperation
period
(3) Early completion incentives
Early completion income will be distributed 20% to
Shajiao power and 80% to HEL. Such income is to be
loaned back to GGPCL to cover construction cost and other
repayments.
3.3.3.2 Operation and Off-take agreement
Under the operation and off-take agreement between GGPC/
Shajiao Power ("Operator") and HEL/GGPCL, each party is
responsible for the following issues:
(1) Operator's responsibility
* Maintain, operate and manage the plant
The operation fee not relating to the supply of coal
will be increased by 5% per annum beginning on 30th June,
1996.
* Supply coal during the cooperation period
If the price of coal rises, the Operator is entitled to
adjust the cost of the coal, which is subject to an
equivalent adjustmeht in the electricity fee. Therefore,
the Operator and GGPCL are shielded from movements in the
coal price.
* Provide transmission network
* Purchase minimum electricity at a fixed price
The minimum purchase obligation is 3,600 million KWH of
electricity each year from each of the three Shajiao C,
which represents 62.27% of the expected installed
capacity of the units, at a fixed price.
The Operator will purchase electricity from GGPCL and
will pay for it in part in US$ and in part in RMB. The
payment is subject to the deduction of an operation fee
payable to Shajiao Power and GGPC for services performed
in relation to the maintenance, operation and management
of the power station and for the supply of coal.
* Make an advance payment to GGPCL
If GGPCL's revenue is not sufficient to meet operating
expenses and payments, the Operator will make an advance
payment. The maximum amount of such payments is limited
to the Minimum Offtake Quantity for the remainder of the
relevant year. However it is not applicable when the
Cash Deficiency is directly attributable to the failure
by GGPCL or HEL to comply with its obligations under the
Operation and Off-take Agreement or the Joint Venture
Contract.
* Accept responsibility for their losses due to the power
station's operation failure
GGPCL and HEL will not be liable for any such losses.
(2) GGPCL's obligation
* Pay the Operator a pre-operation fee and an advance
payment to assist it in purchasing coal and consumables
for construction
* Supply the Operator with transmission equipment, the
value of which does not exceed US$ 40 million
(3) Guarantee from GITIC of Operator's obligation
GITIC provides a guarantee that the Operator will meet
its obligations under the Operation and Off-take
Agreement. The guarantee is only until all amounts due
under the Credit Facilities Agreement have been repaid.
3.3.3.3 Power Station Development Contract
Under a Power Station Development Contract in December,
1992, between HEL, Shajiao Power and GGPCL, the obligation of
HEL in this contract is to:
* Procure the construction and completion of Shajiao C in
accordance with the Turnkey Contract on or before the
Contract Completion Date.
Pay damages to GGPCL if any unit of Shajiao C is not
completed by the Contract Completion Date.
However, HEL has undertaken to pass on to GGPCL all of
its rights and benefits under the Turnkey Contract (including
any damages received) and to enforce its rights under the
Turnkey Contract for the benefit of and in consultation with
GGPCL. GGPCL has undertaken to pay to HEL such amounts as
will enable it to meet its.payment obligations under the
Turnkey Contract (including any bonus payments). GGPCL is
-also obliged to reimburse HEL for certain insurance and other
costs incurred by HEL during the period of construction of
Shajiao C. Under the Turnkey Contract Shajiao Power has
agreed to assist GGPCL, HEL and the contractor in obtaining
various permits, approvals, customs clearances and exemptions
from relevant authorities within the PRC.
3.3.3.4 Turnkey Contract
The Turnkey Contract was agreed upon in August, 1992, by
HEL and a consortium consisting of GA, Slipform, and CE
(Contractor). The Turnkey Contract sets a fixed contract
price of US$ 1,479,044,743 and stipulates that this can only
be increased by reason of changes in Hong Kong or PRC law.
The Turnkey Contract provides for the completion of each unit
by March, 1995, June, 1995, and by September, 1995. These
dates may only be extended by a breach of contract or other
fault, negligence, failure or delay on the part of HEL, force
majeure, variations ordered by HEL or a failure to obtain
necessary PRC consent.
(1) Turnkey contractor's responsibility and rights
Design, construct, complete and bring into commercial
operation the power station.
Pay liquidated damages in the event of delay.
* Repair any defect which arises within two years from
completion of the relevant unit and any latent defects
* Be entitled to a bonus if a unit is completed prior to the
relevant target date for completion
(2) HEL's responsibility and rights
* Pay all principal and interest on the bank financing and
all interest on the shortfall loans and the shareholders
loans if the generating units are not completed by 30th
June, 1996 for reasons other than specified force majeure
events.
* Be entitled to the liquidated damages or, in certain
circumstances, to reject the unit if a unit fails to
maintain warranted heat and output performance levels.
HEL has the right to terminate the project at any time upon
giving written notice to the Contractor; also, the
Contractor can terminate in case HEL fails to make
payments. The Contractor also holds rights to suspend
performance if any specified events of force majeure
prevent it from performing its obligations for a continuous
period of six months. Also, if such events prevent the
Contractor from performing its obligations for a further
continuous period of twelve months then either party may
terminate the Turnkey Contract. In all such cases the
Contractor is entitled to its unpaid costs until the date
of termination. Except in the case of termination for
force majeure, it is entitled to a sum equal to any
expenditure reasonably incurred by the Contractor in the
expectation of completing the power station and to the
demobilization costs.
3.3.4 Financing
The project will cost approximately US$ 1,966 million
(including financing costs anticipated to be US$ 306 million)
of which approximately US$ 1,480 million is the cost of the
Turnkey Contract. The project will be financed through
equity, shareholders loans, and bank financing. The
financial plan of Shajiao C is shown in Table 3-5.
Table 3-5
Financing Plan of Shajiao C: (US$ million)
Shareholders equity: 375
Shajiao Power (60% in RMB)
HEL (40% in US$)
Loans:
Shareholders loans 444
Shajiao Power (in RMB) 185
HEL (in US$) 190
Capitalized Interest 69
Shareholders Shortfall Finance
and capitalized Interest 214
EGB loans and Accrued Interest 183
Foreign Commercial Bank loans 750
Total 1,966
3.3.4.1 Terms and conditions of the loans
The total equity of US$ 375 million is provided 60% by
Shajiao Power in RMB and 40% by HEL in US dollars.
Shareholders loans of US$ 185 million by Shajiao Power and up
to US$ 139 million by HEL will be used for project expenses,
and US$ 51 million of shareholder's loan by HEL will be used
for paying interest at 10% p.a. Regarding the foreign
commercial loans, lenders require GITIC's guarantee for the
US dollar payment of Shajiao power and GGPC under the
Operation and Offtake Agreement before the drawdown of the
commercial loan facility. The terms of the commercial loans
are shown in Table 3-6 and 3-7. These funds are to be repaid
in the same currency from the revenue stream. However, if
the US dollar revenue becomes less than the amount of
repayment, RMB cash flows will be converted into US dollars.
3.3.4.2 Credit Facility Agreement
Under the Credit Facility Agreement between commercial
banks and HEL, HEL has been granted the Term Loan Facility of
US$ 650 million and the Revolving Facility of US$ 100
million.
Table 3-6
Term Loan Facility of Shajiao C
Purpose Finance the payment for coal, design,
construction, and operation
Loan amount US$ 650 million
Interest rates Pre-completion 1.375% above LIBOR
Post-completion 1.0% above LIBOR
Commitment fee 0.375% p.a.
Repayment 8 semiannual
Commencing December, 1996
Table 3-7
Revolving Loan (Letter of Credit) Facility of shajiao C
Purpose Support the Letters of Credit in
respect of the payment of HEL of the electrical
and mechanical portion of Turnkey Contract.
L/C issuing Bank Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd.
Loan amount US$ 100 million
Interest rates Pre-completion 1.375% above LIBOR
Post-completion 1.0% above LIBOR
Guarantee fee 1.25 % p.a.
Repayment Earlier of 30th June, 2000 or six months after
the all repayment of Term Loan Facility
3.3.4.3 Security
The security of the project is provide by fixed and
floating charges over all assets and undertakings of the
borrower, a fixed charge over all the borrower's shares, a
Security Deed, and a Charge of Assets. Under a Security Deed
for the security of Credit Facilities Agreement between HEL
and Commercial Banks, all of HEL's assets and rights,
including those in the following project documents are
assigned to the Agent (Wardley Limited).
* Joint Venture Contract
* Operation and Offtake Agreement
* GITIC guarantee
* Power Station Development Contract
* Performance Bond, Parent company guarantee
* On-Lending Agreement
* Undertaking and Guarantee
* Borrower's interest in all insurance
In addition, under a Charge of Assets between GGPCL and
HEL, HEL secures all the GGPCL's assets as security for its
payment under On-lending Agreement including the assets and
rights in the following documents.
* Contracts: Joint Venture Contract, Operation and Offtake
Contract, power Station Development contract.
* GITIC guarantee
* Insurance Proceeds
* All plant and machinery
* Security accounts
3.3.4.4 Other guarantees and support
* GITIC's guarantee for US$ payment obligation of the
Operator
* Guangdong Provincial People's Government's pledge of its
support by the way of the Comfort Letter for the borrower
* HHL and Shajiao Power's Shortfall Loans up to US$ 250
million
3.4 Navotas I Power Station1
3.4.1 Outline of the project
Navotas I is located at the Navotas Fishport Complex to
the north of Metro Manila in the Philippines. The facility
contains three oil-fired generating units with a combined
capacity of 210 MW. The project was developed under a BOT
project agreement signed in November 1988, between National
Power Corporation (NAPOCOR)2 and Hopewell Project Management
Company Limited (HPML)3 which provides for a 12-year
cooperation period beginning in March, 1991. By an accession
undertaking, Hopewell Energy (Philippines) Corporation (HEPC)4
became a party to the project agreement and agreed to perform
and comply with all obligations of HPML. The construction of
the plant was completed by Slipform, and even though the
construction was delayed for several reasons, the plant has
been successfully operated with high plant availability
ratios. The construction cost of Navotas I was originally
US$ 41 million5 and was financed through a combination of
1 The general description in this section is based on the prospectus of
Consolidated Electric Power Asia Limited. Pyle, Thomas H. Private
Finance of Infrastructure: Understanding the New Hidden Key to
Development Success, A presentation to the World Development Section
of The World Bank, Washington D.C., 11 January 1994. Evans, Peter C.,
Opening Electric Power Generation to the Private Sector in the
Philippines: Policy Origins and Early Experience, Master thesis,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 1991.
2 A government owned entity responsible for the generation of
substantially all of the Philippines' electricity.
3 A 83.36% subsidiary of the Hopewell Holdings Limited.
4 A 60.1 % subsidiary of HPML.
5 HHL, through HPML, provided additional advances of approximately US$
2.8 million to HEPC to cover costs incurred in connection with the
defective equipment.
equity through HPML, Citicorp, IFC, ADB, and limited recourse
term loans and shareholder advances.
3.4.2 Project structure
In the Philippines, law requires foreign companies to
establish local legal entities for pursuing development
projects. Therefore, Hopewell established HEPC, but in
addition Hopewell used HEPC to secure "pioneer" status for
the project from the Board of Investment. The status, only
eligible for local companies, provides the project with a
waiver of the 60-40 rule on foreign ownership, a six year tax
holiday and full exemptions from customs duties and taxes.
On the other hand, the Philippine's Uniform Currency Act
states that, except in certain circumstances, any obligation
contracted between two parties in the Philippines must be
paid in pesos. 1 This means that if the local project company
contracts with NAPOCOR, the currency paid by NAPOCOR must be
in pesos. This status was obviously unacceptable by Hopewell
because of their loan payment in hard currencies. Therefore,
Hopewell constructed a triangular corporate structure among
HPML, HEPC, and NAPOCOR to satisfy its desire for "pioneer"
status, and hard currency payment from NAPOCOR. The project
structure is shown in Figure 3-3.
1 Evans (1991): An Act to Assure Uniform Value to Philippine Coin and
Currency, Republic Act No. 529, (as amended by R. A. No. 4100) June
16, 1950. Section 1 (b).
Hopewell Holdings,LTD.
Hong Kong Republic of the
(and Citibank, IFC.ADB) Philippi n e s
Hopewell Project Management I INational Power
j1
4H
F Commercial
IFC, ADB Banks
A: Sahreholding
B: Parent Guarantee
C: Performanc guarentee regarding Project Agreement
and the Accession Undertaking
D: Accession Undertaling
E: Supply Undertaking
F: Subsciption of a Complimentary Co-financing
G: Project Agreement
H: Term Loans
Figure 3-3
Project Structure of Navotas I
3.4.3 Construction
Slipform was the project manager for the design,
construction and development of this project. Two of the
power station's three units were commissioned ahead of the
contract completion schedule (which had been extended by five
months due to a shipping accident beyond the Group's
control), the commissioning of one unit was delayed primarily
as a result of equipment being found to be defective upon its
delivery to the Philippines. However, before ordering the
equipment, Hopewell had some problems in obtaining certain
governmental consents, in particular the Accession
_ I_
Undertaking by the Department of Finance in support of
NAPOCOR's payment obligations. A further delay occurred in
securing an effectively registered title for the land at
Navotas which was to be leased by NAPOCOR from another
government authority. Pending satisfaction of these
conditions, Hopewell delayed its purchase of the equipment
from Tri-state.1 As a result, Navotas I was completed in
March, 1991, two months behind the extended contract
completion date.
3.4.4 Operation
Navotas I was designed to be utilized only for peak
loading, and its operation on weekends and public holidays
was to be undertaken only upon notice by NAPOCOR. However,
Navotas I has been operating above anticipated levels since
commercial operations commenced as a result of the continuing
power crisis in the Philippines. This has resulted in
increased revenues and a corresponding increase in
maintenance requirements. The only major interruption to
plant operation occurred in September, 1992 when the turbine
blade of one of the units shattered, causing the unit to be
shut down for two months. This resulted in availability for
the year which ended on 30th June, 1993 being reduced to 82%,
compared to 98% for the year which ended 30th June, 1992.
1 Pyle (1994): Three gas turbines were purchased from Tri-State
generation and Transmission Association, a private power generation
cooperative in Denver. The units were Westinghouse W501B gas turbine
generators in operation at Tri-State's Wray, Colorado facility.
Originally installed in 1975, the units had very low running hours.
HEPC has received insurance payments amounting to US$
3,166,010, which covered losses incurred as a result of the
accident. For the month of August, 1993, Navotas I operated
for an average of approximately 19.8 hours per day.
The revenue and operating expenses of HEPC for the two
years ended 30th June, 1993, together with selected operating
statistics of Navotas I, are summarized in Table 3-8.
Table 3-8
Operating Statistics of Navotas I
Year ended 30th June,
1992 1993
Revenue of HEPC ($'000) 106,342 123,220
Operating expenses ($'000) 51,064 62,750
Profit before taxation ($'000) 38,278 52,983
Electricity generated (megawatt hours) 814,509 895,627
Electricity sold (megawatt hours) 800,494 891,246
Electricity sold as a percentage
of installed capacity 46% 51%
Capacity factor 47% 51%
Availability 98% 82%
3.4.5 Risk allocation
3.4.5.1 Project agreement between NAPOCOR and HPML
(1) NAPOCOR's obligation
* Make the site available at no cost and be responsible for
all real estate taxes, rates and other charges in respect
of the site and the power station.
* Ensure the provision of all necessary utilities, and
construct, install and connect the transmission line.
* Supply and deliver all fuel (which must meet the
specifications set out in the Project Agreement) for the
power station at its own cost, and purchase all the
electricity generated at the request of NAPOCOR.
" Pay following fees to HPML on a monthly basis during the
cooperation period,
(i) a capacity fee, payable in US dollars, based on the
contracted capacity for each year following completion of
the power station (as nominated by HPML but not exceeding
210,000 kW unless NAPOCOR agrees) and any capacity rate of
US$ 3.225 per month but subject to adjustment in the event
of any reduction in the available capacity of the power
station during the relevant month;
(ii) an energy fee (payable partly in US dollars and partly
in Pesos, with the portion payable in Pesos being subject
to adjustment for inflation) based on the amount of
electricity generated pursuant to requests from NAPOCOR and
a base energy rate of US$ 0.003 and Pesos 0.023 per kWH;
and
(iii) start-up fees (payable partly in US dollars and
partly in Pesos), in each case calculated in accordance
with formulas specified in the Project Agreement.
* Responsible for all costs and expenses incurred in
connection with the transfer at the end of the cooperation
period.
(2) HPML's obligation
Carry out the design, development, construction,
completion, testing and commissioning of Navotas I
* Raise all funds for the HPML's portion of the contract
(US$ 41 million) of the project.
* Obtain all necessary approvals and the importation of all
necessary equipment.
* Deliver the power station, together with all fixtures,
fittings, machinery and equipment, and be responsible for
its management, operation, maintenance and repair.
* Maintain insurance with respect to the power station
construction and development during the cooperation period.
* Transfer the power station to NAPOCOR for no consideration
at the end of the cooperation period on an "as is" basis.
3.4.5.2 Other specific approvals
HPML required NAPOCOR other specific approvals to ensure
the project profitability and bankability (Pyle, 1994).
* "Pioneer status" of the project, allowing exemptions
from tax for six years and from custom duties on
imported equipment and supplies
* Certification from National Economic and Development
authority confirming that the project had "high
national priority"
* Receipt of a performance undertaking from the Republic
of the Philippines for NAPOCOR's payment obligations,
including an "Accession Undertaking".
Pyle (1994) says that the Accession Undertaking was a
vital and unique feature of this BOT financing. Under
Accession Undertaking Hopewell may require NAPOCOR to buy
out, or NAPOCOR may require Hopewell to sell out upon the
occurrence of certain specified events, including;
* Any approval, consent, law, or regulations required for
the project are withdrawn, rescinded, or amended
* Any changes in Philippine law or regulations which
materially and adversely affect HPML's interest in the
power station or its economic return on its investment
* Any failure by NAPOCOR to pay sums due for 3 months
* The operation difficulty of the power station due to
subsequent environmental laws or regulations
* Certain events of force majeurel, related to wars or riots
involving the Philippines, or actions taken by any
governmental authority within the Republic of the
Philippines, or any other event which shall be within the
reasonable control of NAPOCOR or the Government or any
agency or regional or municipal authority of it.
3.4.5.3 Government guarantee
The obligations of NAPOCOR under the Project Agreement
and the Accession undertaking are guaranteed by the Republic
of the Philippines.
1 In general, each party's performance of its obligations under the
Project Agreement is excused due to an event of Force Majeure outside
its reasonable control.
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3.4.6 Financing .
3.4.6.1 Conditions for financing proposed by Hopewell
Hopewell's bids included two important conditions to
ensure the profitability and bankability of the project.
First, if Hopewell were to arrange bridge financing for the
equipment and construction cost, the Philippine government
would have to agree to Hopewell's subsequent arrangement of
long-term refinancing. Second, all payments from NAPOCOR
would have to be guaranteed by the Republic of the
Philippines. Based on this understanding a project agreement
was signed in November and Hopewell formed a wholly owned
subsidiary of HEPC.
3.4.6.2 Cost and financing structure
The total project cost, US$ 41 million, of Navotas I
consists of US$ 33 million for machinery and equipment and
another US$ 8 million for civil works and financing expenses.
The finance was provided by equity and limited recourse term
loans and shareholder advances. Costs and financing
structure are shown in Table 3-9 and 3-10.
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Table 3-9
Cost of Navotas I: (US$ 000)
Supply of gas turbine station 23,600
Refurbishment and modifications 1,165
Dismantling, inspecting, packaging, shipping, 4,450
re-installing, commissioning, testing
Electrical switch gear and installation 1,300
Ancillary power station equipment and 1,750
Installation
Spare parts 100
32,365
Civil engineering 2,057
Project supervision and engineering 800
Insurance 700
Financing, professional and legal fees 700
Interest, start-up expenses, working capital 3,378
7,635
Total 41,000
Table 3-10
Financing Plan of Navotas I: (US$ 000)
Shareholder funds: 11,000
HPML 60.1%
Citicorp 19.9%
IFC 10.0%
ADB 10.0%
Term Loans:
IFC 10,000
ADB 10,000
Commercial banks 10,000
(under ADB Complimentary Co-financing)
Total project cost 41,000
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A total of US$ 11 million was provided in the form of
equity contributions from HPML and other minority
shareholders of HEPC. HHL made shareholder loans of US$ 5.5
million to HPML to fund HPML's equity contributions to HEPC.
Term loans totaling US$ 20 million were provided to HEPC by
the IFC and the ADB, each of which has a final maturity date
of 15th September, 1999. In addition, a syndicated term loan
in the amount of US$ 10 million was provided by four
commercial banks and is required to be repaid by 15th
September 1996. Such term loans are secured by a charge on
almost all of the property and assets of HEPC, including all
of the assets related to Navotas I. Under the agreements
governing such loans, dividends may not be paid by HEPC
unless certain requirements are met by them and an event of
default under the terms of such agreements has not occurred.
Of the original US$ 30 million combined principal amount in
term loans, US$ 19.3 million was outstanding on the 31st
August, 1993.
* Loan from ADB to HEPC
ADB made a loan of US$ 10 million to HEPC amounting to
10 % of the share capital of HEPC. The loan is repayable in
36 quarterly payments, commencing on 15 December, 1990, with
the final payment due on 15th September, 1999. HEPC is
obliged to pay interest at a rate of 11.35% per annum on the
principal amount outstanding from time to time and a
commitment charge of 1% per annum on undrawn amounts.
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* Complementary Loan From the ADB to HEPC
The ADB made an additional loan of US$ 10 million to
HEPC, to be funded by the ADB entirely from participation in
the loan by commercial banks. The loan is repayable in 24
quarterly installments with the final payment due on 15th
September, 1996. HEPC is obliged to pay interest at a rate
of 1.75% per annum above the London inter-bank offered rate
and a commitment charge of 0.5% per annum in respect of
undrawn amounts.
* Loan from IFC
IFC made a loan of US$ 10 million to HEPC amounting to
10% of the share capital of HEPC. The loan is repayable in
36 quarterly payments, commencing on 15 December, 1990, with
the final payment due on 15th September, 1999. HEPC is
obliged to pay interest on the principal amount outstanding
from time to time at a rate of 2% above the London inter-bank
offered rate. In addition, a commitment charge of 0.5% per
annum is payable in respect to undrawn amounts.
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3.5 Pagbilao Power Station1
3.5.1 Outline of the project
Pagbilao is situated on a sparsely populated island
located approximately 100 miles south of Manila in the
Philippines. The facility, being developed on a BOT basis,
will contain two 367.5 MW pulverized-coal-fired generating
units, and will be the largest coal-fired thermal power plant
in the Philippines. Hopewell Power (Philippines) Corporation
(HPPC)2 established by HEIL, IFC, CDC3, and the ADB will build
the plant and operate it for 25 years and will then turn it
over to the Philippines National Power Corporation.
The construction of Pagbilao is being undertaken by a
turnkey contractor consortium comprised of Mitsubishi
Corporation of Japan and Slipform, and the project management
is being carried out by Hopewell Tileman Limited.4 The
construction of Pagbilao commenced in April, 1993, and the
expected completion dates for the first and second units are
April and July, 1996.5
The cost of the project is estimated to be US$ 933
million of which US$ 235 million will be funded through the
equity contributions by HEIL, IFC, CDC, and the ADB to HPPC,
1 The general description in this section is based on the prospectus of
Consolidated Electric Power in Asia, and the Engineering Business,
1993.
2 A wholly owned subsidiary of Hopewell Energy International Limited
(HEIL), a 49% associated company of the Hopewell Holdings Limited.
3 Commonwealth Development Corporation.
4 A subsidiary of the Hopewell Holdings Limited.
5 The Hopewell's directors expect that the units will commence
commercial operations approximately seven months ahead of those dates
During the early completion period.
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and through loans and other credit facilities by JEXIM,
USEXIM, IFC, CDC, the ADB, and other third parties to HPPC.
3.5.2 Project structure
The project structure is similar to Navotas I. Hopewell
established a triangular corporate structure among NAPOCOR,
HEIL in HongKong, and HPPC in the Philippines to acquire the
pioneer status and hard currency payment from NAPOCOR. The
other particularity of this project is the loan participation
of ECAs and MLAs. In addition, the co-financing facility
through IFC is under negotiation.
A: Shareholding
B: Loan Agreement: Common Agreement
C: Subordinated loans
D: Turnkey Contract
E: Payment: Trust and Retention Agreement
F: US dollar payment for electricity
G: Energy Conversion Agreement
H: Government Guarantee
I: Subordinated loans
Figure 3-4
Project Structure of Pagbilao
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3.5.3 Risk allocation
Project associated risks are allocated to each
participant through contracts and agreements such as the
Energy Conversion Agreement, the Turnkey Contract, the
Completion Support Agreement, Common Agreements, and the
Trust and Retention Agreement.
3.5.3.1 Energy Conversion Agreement
This.agreement specifies the rights and obligations
between NAPOCOR and HEIL (HPPC) regarding the energy
conversion.
(1) NAPOCOR's obligation
* Provide site at no cost and to construct, install and
connect the transmission line
* Supply and deliver all fuel for the power station
* Pay following fees for the all electricity generated by
the power station at the request of NAPOCOR
(i) a capacity fee based on the contracted capacity for
each unit for each year
The capacity fee is divided into a capital recovery fee
payable in US dollars, a fixed operating fee payable
partly in US dollars and partly in Pesos and subject to
adjustment for inflation, an infrastructure fee payable
in US dollars, and a service fee payable in US dollars.
(ii) an energy fee-payable partly in US dollars and partly
in Pesos and subject to adjustment for inflation-based on
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the amount of electricity generated by requests from
NAPOCOR
* Pay to HPPC/HEIL early completion income and fees equal to
the capacity fees and the energy fees when a unit is
completed ahead of schedule
* Buyout the plant from HEIL if certain events occur which
materially and adversely affect HEIL's interest in the
project or its economic return on its investment, such as
any changes in Philippine law or regulations, force
majeure, NAPOCOR's failure to ensure the payment of any sum
within 3 months of its due date.
An Energy Conversion Agreement is not held responsible
if it is prevented from performing such obligations due to
an event of force majeure outside its reasonable control.
However, NAPOCOR shall not escape responsibility for an
event of force majeure relating to wars, riots, or other
events involving any governmental authority or the Republic
of the Philippines, or any other event within the
reasonable control of NAPOCOR, regional or municipal
authority, and the government of the Republic of the
Philippines.
(2) Government guarantee
The obligations of NAPOCOR under the Energy Conversion
Agreement and the Accession Undertaking are guaranteed by
the Republic of the Philippines.
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(3) HEIL's obligation
* Construct, maintain a bridge connecting between Pagbilao
Grande Island to the mainland
* Provide a 10,000 KVA electricity sub-station for the
electricity required during the construction process
* Arrange the financing of the project
* Obtain all necessary approvals
* Import all necessary equipment
* Pay penalties in the event that completion is delayed for
more than 30 days due to the fault of HEIL excepting the
delays by specified events of force majeure
* Transfer both units to NAPOCOR on an "as is" basis for no
consideration at the end of the cooperation period
(4) Standby letter of credit by Citibank N.A.
HEIL has procured the provision by Citibank N.A. of a
standby letter of credit in a maximum amount of US$ 16
million in respect of HEIL's obligations to make such
payments. In the event that this standby letter of credit
is fully drawn, HEIL has no further liability to make
penalty payments.
3.5.3.2 Turnkey Contract
HPPC and a turnkey consortium consisting of Mitsubishi
Corporation (MC) and Slipform have agreed to do all things
necessary to achieve the design, construction, completion,
commissioning, and bringing to full commercial operation the
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power station to the standards and within the time specified
in the Turnkey Contract for a fixed price of US$ 743,948,000.
The obligation of the contractor and HPPC are as follows:
(1) Contractor's obligation
* Pay liquidated damages not exceeding 20 percent of the
contract in the event of the construction delay and the
lack of plant performance.
* Make subordinated loans up to US$ 200 million to HPPC if
any funding insufficiencies of HPPC arises from breach or
default of the Turnkey Contract by Mitsubishi or Slipform
under the Turnkey Contractor Completion Support Agreement
between HPPC, HHL, HEIL, Mitsubishi Corporation (HongKong),
Ltd. However, this obligation shall not arise during an
event of force majeure; also, all the obligations of
Mitsubishi under the Completion Support Agreement have been
guaranteed by its parent company MC, and Slipform's
obligation in respect of its performance and payment is
guaranteed by HHL.
(2) HPPC's obligation
* Payment of the contract price
* Provide access to the site, and sufficient labor for the
operation
* Provide coal, fuel oil, and electricity
" Assist the contractor in obtaining necessary approvals
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3.5.3.3 Sponsor Completion Support Agreement
Under the agreement among HPPC, HHL, HEIL, the various
lenders to the project described below, and BankAmerica
National Trust Company (Trustee)-HHL and HEIL agreed to make
subordinated loans up to an aggregate amount of US$ 200
million to HPPC to meet any funding insufficiency. In
addition, HHL and HEIL have agreed to make additional
subordinated loans of up to US$ 51 million (or in excess of
such amount if HHL and HEIL agrees) if called upon to do so
by HPPC pursuant to the Common Agreement.
3.5.4 Financing
The particularity of this project is the participation
of JEXIM and USEXIM. This is the first time that these banks
provide limited-recourse financing without government
guarantees for a very large power project in a developing
country. IFC's Chaudhry, a power division manager, said that
"The availability of export credits without guarantees from
host country governments will be critical in expanding the
private sector's role in the power sector."I HPPC's financial
plan is shown in Table 3-11.
1 International Finance Corporation, News, 29 April 1993.
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Table 3-11
Financial Plan of Pagbilao: (US$ million)
Shareholder funds: 235.0
HEIL 87.5% 205.0
IFC 4.25% 10.0
CDC 4.25% 10.0
ADB 4.25% 10.0
Term Loans:
JEXIM 367.5
USEXIM 185.0
IFC 60.0
ADB 40.0
CDC 35.0
Third parties through IFC 11.0
933.0
3.5.4.1 Loans and share subscription agreements
The borrower is HPPC and the agreements are named CDC
Investment Agreement, IFC Investment Agreement, ADB
Investment Agreement, JEXIM Loan Agreement, USEXIM Loan
Agreement, and Citibank Credit Agreement. Each agreement's
terms and conditions are shown in Table 3-12 and 3-13.
Table 3-12
Terms and Conditions of the Loans for Pagbilao (1)
CDC IFC IFC, Co- ADB
financing( Under
negotiation)
Equity (US$) 10 million 10 million 0 10 million
Loan (US$) 35 million 60 million 40 million 40 million
Interest rates 9.75 % p.a. 10.25 % p.a. conditional 10.25 % p.a.
Ccmnitment fees 1.00 % p.a. 1.00 % p.a. conditional 1.00 % p.a.
US$ 350,000 1 % of the loan US$ 400,000
(front end fee) (front end fee) (arrangement
fee)
Repayment 12 equal 20 equal half- conditional 20 equal half-
seniannual yearly yearly
Ccunencing July, 1997 July, 1997 conditional July, 1997
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Table 3-13
Terms and Conditions of the Loans for Pagbilao (2)
JEXIM JEXIM Citibank USEXIM
(construction (operation
period) period)
Equity (US$) 0 0 0 0
Loan (US$) 220,411,500 146,941,000 172,442,600
Interest rates 7.46 % p.a. 2.15 % above 2.75 % above 7.16 % p.a.
LIBOR LIBOR
Commitment fees 0.50 % p.a. 0.50 % p.a. 1.00 % p.a. 0.50 % p.a.
Repayment 12 pro rata 20 pro rata Single 20 equal
semiannual semiannual installment semiannual
Ccamencing July, 1997 July, 1997 March, 1997 or July, 1997
30 days after
project's
cumpletion
* CDC Investment Agreement
HPPC must comply with certain procurement requirements,
including the United Kingdom suppliers and contractors must
be given full opportunity to pre-qualify and to submit
tenders on a basis no less favorable than others.
* IFC Investment Agreement
HPPC is obliged to make mandatory prepayment in
accordance with the Trust and Retention Agreement or on a
pro rata basis in the event of a prepayment under any of the
other financing documents. The provisions of the Common
Agreement concerning events of default are incorporated by
reference into the IFC Investment Agreement
" ADB Investment Agreement
ADB's obligation to subscribe shares and to make
available the loan may be suspended or canceled by the ADB
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upon the occurrence of certain specified events including an
event of default under the Common Agreement.
* JEXIM Loan Agreement
The right of HPPC to make drawings is subject to
suspension in certain circumstances, including where there
is an event of default under the Common Agreement and JEXIM
Loan Agreement shall terminate automatically in accordance
with the provisions of the Common Agreement. HPPC may be
required to pay the outstanding principal amounts in
accordance with the terms of the Trust and Retention
Agreement or in the event of a prepayment under any of the
other financing documents.
* USEXIM Loan Agreement
The facility is subject to mandatory prepayment in
accordance with the Trust and Retention Agreement or in the
event of a prepayment under any of the other financing
agreements. The provisions of the Common Agreement
concerning events of default are incorporated by reference
into the USEXIM Credit Agreement.
* Citibank Credit Agreement
The right of HPPC to disbursements of the loan and the
issuance of letters of credit is subject to suspension in
certain events, including where there is an event of default
under the Common Agreement. The obligations of HPPC to
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certain of the Banks under the Citibank Credit Agreement are
guaranteed by USEXIM upon the occurrence of certain
political or economic conditions or events. A guarantee
exposure fee is payable by HPPC to USEXIM.
3.5.4.2 Common Agreement
Lenders secure their right by setting out certain common
representations, warranties and covenants given by HPPC to
each of the Lenders, certain uniform conditions of
disbursements and certain common events of default.
Events of default include (i) default by HPPC under any
of the project documents or financing documents referred to
above or in respect of any other indebtedness for borrowed
money; (ii) default by any of HEIL, HTPSC or, prior to
completion of the project, Slipform or Hopewell Tileman
Limited in respect of any indebtedness for borrowed money
exceeding US$ 1 million; (iii) default by HHL or MC in
respect of any indebtedness for borrowed money exceeding US$
10 million or US$ 20 million respectively, in each case prior
to completion of the project; (iv) the winding-up or
liquidation of any of HPPC, HHL, HEIL, HTPSC or, prior to
completion of the project, MC, Slipform or Hopewell Tileman
Limited; and (v) HHL ceasing to own, directly or indirectly,
at least 51% of the voting rights in HEIL.
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3.5.4.3 Trust and Retention Agreement
Under a Trust and Retention Agreement among HPPC, HEIL,
HHL, MC, Mitsubishi, Slipform, the lenders and trustee, all
proceeds received by HPPC from the sale of electricity (other
than payments made by NAPOCOR in Pesos under the Energy
Conversion Agreement), insurance claims, payments received
under the Turnkey Contract, the Sponsor Completion Support
Agreement and the Contractor Support Agreement and from any
secured assets are to paid into an account established by the
Trustee.
The Trustee is to apply such proceeds on behalf of HPPC
first in payment of operating and maintenance costs and taxes
owed by HPPC and second in payment of interest and principal
due under the various financing documents in the order of
priority specified in the Trust and Retention Agreement.
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3.6 Second Stage Expressway1
3.6.1 Outline of the project
The Second Stage Expressway (SES) is located in Bangkok,
Thailand. The project has been developed under the
Concession Agreement between the Expressway and Rapid Transit
Authority of Thailand (ETA) and the Bangkok Expressway Co.
Ltd. (BECL) led by Japanese Kumagai Gumi Co., Ltd. It is the
first large project performed by public-private partnership
in Thailand. The concession period is 30 years from March,
1990 which was when the construction began.
The purpose of the entire expressway system was to ease
the traffic jams in downtown Bangkok which had become a
threat to the city's economic growth. In addition, the
system had to be constructed systematically in order to cope
with the expanding commuting area and increased travel which
accompanied the rapid expansion of the city. The 20-mile SES
project is an extension of the First Stage Expressway project
constructed by the government, and Third and Fourth Stage
1 The information in this section is based on the following docuiments:
Handley, Paul, "No Highway?," Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 August
1993. Hirsh, Michael, "Thanks for the highway, now take a hike," Asia
Journal, May 1993. Handley, Paul "Road to Ruin," Far Eastern Economic
Review, 10 June 1993. Reina, Peter, "Bangkok builds BOT
megaprojects," Enginnering News-Record, 15 June 1992. Reina, Peter,
"Bangkok exploits its market strengths to attract BOT builders for
transit," Public Works Financing July 1992. Ferrigno, Joseph W., "The
Bangkok Second Stage Expressway Project," Public Works Financing July
1990. Barns, William and Victor Mallet, "Thais make a mess of their
muddling," Financial Times, 22 June 1993. The Expressway and Rapid
Transit Authority of Thailand, Balancing Public and private sector
interests, September 1993. The Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority
of Thailand, Overview of the Second Stage Expressway System in Greater
Bangkok, March 1989. Makioka, Hiroshi, Project finance for
transportation Projects, Master thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, June 1992. Ishikawa, Hiroshi, "How to BOT,"
Infrastructure Finance, Fall 1992.
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Expressways are being considered in the future. The route of
SES is shown in Figure 3-5.
Sec
-----. Sector A
2,,,,,,,,16 Sector B
......... Sector C1
O Expressway/Expressway interchange
* Expressway/Alt Purpose Road Interchange
Ramps
------ Sector C2
Sector D
SThe First Stage Expressway
Figure 3-5
Route of the Second Stage Expressway1
The feasibility study of the SES project was conducted
by the ETA with the cooperation of the Japan International
1 The Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (1989): Sector
Plans Proposed by BECL.
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Cooperation Agency (JICA) from 1982 to 1983. In March, 1985,
the Council of Ministers approved the SES project. Following
the approval, the ETA commissioned a detailed design of the
expressway in 1986. In June, 1987, the Council of Ministers
advised the ETA to involve the private sector in the SES
project, and in August, the ETA invited interested firms to
submit proposals. The ETA received two proposals, one from
BECL and the other from the Thai Expressway Development Joint
Venture Co., Ltd. The ETA finally selected BECL, negotiated
detailed conditions, and signed a contract in December 1988.
In the project, the ETA is in charge of land
acquisition, and BECL will reimburse them for its cost during
the concession period. The Kumagai Gumi Co. Ltd. acted as
construction manager for the design and construction of the
project with a staff of 300. Kumagai had provided a warranty
for the cost and completion of construction works which was
secured by performance bonds. BECL separated the job into
substructure and deck contracts, and awarded seven contracts
to five consortiums for Sectors A and C1 of the first 12.4-
mile section.
The cost of the project is expected to be Baht 27.5
billion (US$ 1.1 billion: excluding land acquisition cost),
of which Baht 5.5 billion (US$ 220 million) is provided by
the equity contribution of Kumagai, seven local banks, and
the Asian Development Bank; also, Baht 22 billion (US$ 880
million) is provided by Onshore and Offshore Credit
Facilities.
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3.6.2 Project structure
A: Shareholding
B: Term Loan
C: Warranty Agreement, Project Management Agreement
D: Concession Agreement
E: Reports
F: Revenue share
G: Agreement
Figure 3-6
Project Structure of the Second Stage Expressway
3.6.3 Particularity of the concession scheme
When the project was negotiated in 1987-88 with the
former government, the government supported the
implementation of this scheme. First it agreed to share the
toll revenues with BECL for the entire expressway system
according to the agreed ratio. Second, it agreed that the ETA
would acquire the land necessary for the project and BECL
would refund it during the concession period. This
arrangement was profitable for BECL because, under the ETA's
land acquisition, some privileges, including an eight year
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corporate income tax relief after earning the revenue, and
tax exemptions on dividends, are eligible to the concession
(Augenblick and Custer, 1990).
The government also gave BECL recourse to some remedies
in the case of "Exceptional occurrences" (Augenblick and
Custer, 1990). Such remedies are:
* an adjustment in the revenue sharing proportions
* an increase in tolls on the system
* an extension of the duration of the revenue allocation
percentage
* an extension of the overall concession period of the
project
"Exceptional occurrences" are:
* material increase in interest rate
* material economic dislocation in Thailand
* material delays in the relocation or diversion of utilities
* government action or inaction (including undue interference
with the execution of the project
* unanticipated adverse ground conditions
* significant disruptions in the local construction and
building materials industries
* non-insurable events of force majeure
3.6.4 Construction
BECL's original construction schedule' was to:
1 The Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (1989).
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* start construction on March 1, 1990 with completion by
March 1, 1993 for Sector A and C1.
* start construction on August 1, 1992 with completion by
August 1, 1995 for Sector B.
Although Sectors A and C1 were officially completed in
November, 1992, the construction tended to fall behind
schedule mainly because of the land acquisition problems of
the ETA. The construction of Sector B has not yet started
because the land has not been fully acquired.
The SES is an almost entirely elevated structure;
therefore, the viaduct's design has a critical impact on the
construction costs and schedules. Kumagai found that the
ETA's original design of U-beams and box girders was more
expensive than the span by span construction using match-cast
segments. Segmental construction is only advantageous when
the number of the spans are considerable because of the high
initial investment cost for huge launching girders and the
construction of a precasting plant. BECL arranged for a
single precasting plant to serve all the contractors in order
to maximize the learning curve and minimize the cost of the
products. BECL supplied most of the equipment and materials,
and the German/Thai consortium operated the plant. The
adoption of the segmental construction and the usage of
single precasting plant are considered the main reason for
the success of its scheduling.
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3.6.5 Financing
The SES's financing scheme was recognized as an
innovative example because of the Thai banks' positive
participation and because of the cooperation between Thai and
foreign banks. The loans were the largest in the local
financial market in terms of amounts and maturity in spite of
the Thai banks' severe limit on lending to single borrowers.
Because all of the revenue comes from tolls in Baht, Baht
financing was deemed necessary to minimize exchange risk, so
foreign investment bankers put together the offshore facility
of 5 billion Baht credit to guarantee the Thai's onshore
facility. Lenders were to be secured by the relevant
provisions under the Civil and commercial Code of Thailand,
various assignment and share pledges, and a construction
warranty by Kumagai. The security package was granted from
the Thai Military Bank, an agent of the lenders.
However, the syndication has fallen apart between the
domestic and foreign investors because of the government's
failure to keep the scheduled land acquisition and because
they decreased the toll from Baht 30. Local banks have been
willing to support the government because of their political
connection with it. The government's two deputy prime
ministers and the finance minister are former top executives
of three of the principal banks: Siam Commercial Bank, Thai
Military Bank and Bangkok Bank.
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3.6.5.1 Original financial structure
Table 3-14
Funds' Sources and Uses of SES
Sources:
Shareholder's equity
Credit
ETA's bond
(Baht million)
5,500
22,000
14,300
Total 41,800
Uses:
Construction cost 25,000
Land acquisition cost 16,800
Total 41,800
Under the Shareholder Agreement of March 21, 1989, the
shareholders capital was Baht 5,500 million. Kumagai held 70
% of the shares. Kumagai intended to sell their shares and
subscribe new shares to the public after the project entered
the operation stage. The list of share holders is shown in
Table 3-15.
Table 3-15
Shareholder's Percentage of the Shares in BECL
Shareholders %
Bangkok Bank
Siam Commercial Bank
Bureau of the Crown Property
Thai Military Bank
Krung Thai bank
Asia Bank
Chor Karn Chang
Kumagai Gumi
Total
9.43
3.00
2.66
3.77
3.64
2.50
5.00
70.00
100.00
Note: In December 1990, Asian Development Bank (ADB)
formally signed agreements with BECL to provide a long-term
loan and equity investment of US$ 40 million. However that
amount is not counted in this table because of the lack of
information.
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Under the Onshore Credit facilities Agreement of March
21, 1989, with a syndication of 11 major local banks, the
total credit amount is up to Baht 22,000 million. The
onshore facility is comprised of three separate parts,
Tranches A to C. Tranche A finances up to Baht 15,000
million, Tranche B up to Baht 5,000 million supported by the
Offshore Credit Facility, Tranche C up to Baht 2,000 million.
The onshore facility will mature in March 2009, with
repayment beginning in March 1996. The borrowing under
Tranche B is supported by an Offshore Credit Facility
consisting of 30 major international banks led by Credit
Lyonnais, DKB Asia, LTCB Asia, and Nat West. The Offshore
facility provides guarantees to Tranche B for loans up to the
lower of Baht 5,500 million or US$ 275 million. The facility
includes a US$ 100 million revolving loan. The Offshore
Credit Facilities will have reached final maturity in early
1999.
3.6.5.2 Original forecast of economic return
Economic analyses of the project were conducted by JICA
in 1983, and the National Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd.
(NECCO) in 1986. JICA and NECCO took slightly different
routes in analyzing the economic return. However, both
studies concluded that the SES would be economically viable.
Their results are shown in Table 3-16 and 3-17.
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Table 3-16
Comparative Investment Cost of SES
Source (Year) Investment Cost (Baht million)
JICA (1983) 16,118.82
NECCO(1986) 17,620.00
BECL (1989) 30,399.00
Note: Excluding Interest during construction
Table 3-17
Comparative Economic Analysis of SES
Description JICA (1983) NECCO (1986)
Net Present Value* 6.09 20.60
(Baht 1000 million)
B/C ratio* 1.65 2.32
IRR (%) 17.00 22.60
*) discount rate: 12%
3.6.6 Current issues
The project was originally negotiated in 1987-88 when
the military backed government, Prem Tinsulanonda, was
stable. However, after the bloodless coup in February 1991,
the new government changed the land evaluation basis of the
SES from a lower tax value to a higher market value in order
to acquire popularity. Because of this change, the land
purchase price tripled, and it became difficult for the ETA
to acquire land on schedule. As a result, the ETA delayed
providing land for the BECL in Sectors A and C1, and did not
completely acquire the land necessary for the rest of the
construction of the SES. Further, the ETA began to explore
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the ambiguities of the concession contract as the SES's
opening approached. For example, when the construction of
Sectors A and Cl was officially completed in November, 1992,
BECL claimed a share of the toll of Baht 30. However, the
ETA had a different view, holding that the toll sharing could
only begin after the priority components were operational.
Because it did not have these funds, BECL defaulted on its
interest payments, and the banks suspended their loans to
BECL in February, 1993. In addition, in April, two weeks
before the opening of sectors A and C1, the government
announced a change in the predetermined toll rates from Baht
30 to Baht 20 in order to maintain its popularity with the
public. The cut in tolls was to be made at the expense of
the ETA which was almost bankrupt.
Kumagai decided to withdraw from this project because it
could not live with the ETA's ambiguous attitude and
Thailand's insufficient legal structure. International
bankers and businessmen have said that even though Thailand
desperately needs huge infrastructure improvements, the Thai
government's decision against the SES makes it harder to
finance at least US$ 30 billion worth of planned projects.
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3.7 North-South Highway1
3.7.1 Outline of the project
The 785 km North-South Highway Project is a part of the
900 km expressway system, which extends through the Malay
peninsula from the Thai border to Singapore. It was
originally started by the government; however, because of
financial difficulties, the government decided to complete
the remaining 504 km portion of the project using the BOT
method. The project, including finance, design,
construction, and operation, was awarded in 1987 to Project
Lebuhraya Utara-Selatan Bhd (PLUS), a joint venture company
formed by United Engineers Malaysia (UEM) and the Faber
Group, for a 30-year concession period from May, 1988 to May,
2018.
The construction was delayed because of PLUS's limited
financial resources, and their technical inexperience. As a
result, the expected completion date of construction has been
postponed from 1992 to 1995.
The construction cost was initially estimated to be US$
1.3 billion, but it is currently estimated to be around US$
2.3 billion, which is being financed through the Malaysian
capital market, and commercial and government loans.
1 The general description in this section is based on the following
articles: Hensley, Matthew L. and Edward P. White (1993). Vellu,
S.S., "Policy Towards BOT Projects and the Incentives Provided by the
Malaysian Government to Promote Private Sector Financing of Major
Projects," Conference on "BOT Opportunities in Asia," Nov. 1988.
Reinhardt, William G., "The Road Case Study #5: Malaysia," unpublished
article.
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3.7.2 Project structure
A: Joint Venture Agreement
B: Concession Agreement
C: Loan Agreement
D: Loan Agreement
E: Shareholding
F: Construction Contract
Figure 3-7
Project Structure of the North-South Highway
3.7.3 Construction
PLUS appointed Pengurusan Lebuhraya Berhad (PL) to
manage the highway's construction work, and contracted with
around 40 sub-contractors for the project. Because the
project is geographically spread out, PLUS established a head
office in Kuala Lumpur and regional offices along the route
of the highway. PL also regionally separated the
Construction Management Division and the Contract Division,
but all offices are staffed in a similar way.'
3.7.4 Government support
The project has been criticized as an example of a
1 Lam, Patrick, Procurement of Infrastructure Through the Privatisation
Approach, Master thesis, University of Bath, United Kingdom, 1992.
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misuse of privatization in terms of the contract-awarding
process, and of excessive government support after the award
was made to UEM. In the bidding stage, the government
-discouraged potential competitors by limiting its support;
consequently, very few contractors bid on the project. As a
result PLUS, the joint venture company formed by UEM and the
Faber Group, whose major shareholders included the Prime
Minister and the Minister of Public Works, was awarded the
contract. Neither UEM nor Fabor had proven track records for
highway projects, nor did they have strong financial
standing. After PLUS had been awarded the project, however,
the government developed an extensive security package for
them, including the following aspects:
* Right-of-way
* Negotiated toll rates: the concession company receives the
absolute right to the collection of all toll charges for
their own benefit for 30 years
* Support loans of MS 1.65 billion for 10 years
* Traffic volume guarantee; traffic volume supplement to meet
any shortfall for the first 17 years
* External risks supplement, to meet any advance exchange
rate movements during the first 17 years
* Guarantees against foreign exchange and interest rate risk
* Guarantees against various events of force majeure or
government action
130
3.7.5 Financing
The cost of the construction has been estimated around
US$ 2.3 billion. At the time of the award, PLUS did not have
equity for the project. However, it has raised over US$
296.3 million in the local stock market; also, it expects to
raise another US$ 444 million to cover its cost overrun. In
addition, they have obtained US$ 926 million in 15-year
commercial loans from local banks with both fixed and
floating rates together with the government loans of 630
million in US dollars.
Table 3-18
PLUS's Financing Plan of NSH: (US$ million)
Equity 296.3
(Local stock market) 444.0 (planning)
Loans
Government 630.0
Commercial 926.0
Total 2,296.3
3.7.6 Earlier Road Projects in Malaysia
Before the North-South Highway was implemented, three
road projects had already been carried out under the BOT
scheme. The first project was the North Kelang Straits
Bypass Project, an urban bypass, with a 25-year concession
period and an estimated cost of US$ 7.4 million. The second
project was the Kepong Interchange Project in Kuala Lumpur,
under a 9-year concession period with a cost of US$ 31.9
million. Both projects have completed construction and are
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now under operation. The third project was the Kuala Lumpur
Interchange Project, a series of seven urban interchanges and
toll plazas, with a 12-year concession period and a cost of
about US$ 11 million. The government itself set the toll
rates, designed the interchanges, and awarded the concession
for the bidder with the shortest concession period. The
government tried to utilize the effect of competition in this
contract. The concessionaire received no government
guarantee. However, in 1991 after the road opened, three
days of riots ensued in the city against the government-set
toll rates. The toll was immediately reduced by half, and
the revenue difference has been compensated for by the
government. As a result of this experience, the government
and BOT proponents understood the necessity of certain
government guarantees.
3.7.7 Particularity of road projects in Malaysia
The Malaysian government limited its role in the first
three projects because the government's objective was the
complete transfer of risks to the private sectors.
Therefore, the government did not provide any risk guarantee
to concessionaires. By contrast, the North-South Highway
project was highly guaranteed because the government felt the
necessity for some government guarantee for the third project
and because of its own connection to it. Therefore, the
government severely mitigated the risk in that project. In a
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sense, Malaysia has moved from one extreme to another in the
public-private risk sharing (Reinhardt).
The Malaysian BOT is generally considered successful
because of the actual completion of several projects. The
government has strategically developed BOTs from small
projects to larger ones, which enhanced their learning curve
and decreased the damage experienced through their mistakes.
Mr. John Burnham, a director of J. Henry Shroeder Wagg,
a large UK. bank, explained the Malaysian success as
follows:
1. They started down the BOT road at a time when the
local economy was in acute recession and public funds
for capital projects were scarce. There was a strong
need to seek private capital.
2. The public works agencies had made some mistakes on
previous projects resulting in large overruns and
foreign exchange losses. There was a feeling among top
political operatives and within certain segments of the
civil service that private concessionaires could manage
the risks more effectively.
3. The government made strong efforts to be flexible in
sharing risks so that the concessions ended up being
financeable deals. Different terms were negotiated for
each project depending on real-world assessment of its
economic viability and tried to hand all of its risks
over to the private sector.
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4. The move to BOT came from the Prime Minister and
other senior members of the government. That greatly
helped to overcome bureaucratic inertia and outright
opposition. In addition, the public procurement team
was centralized at a high level within the government.
That created a wider perspective than would have been
possible at the level of individual Ministries. It
also meant that new approaches could be taken quickly
and unilaterally, without having to stop and educate
the various segments of the civil service first..
5. The BOT program was launched by giving infrastructure
entrepreneurs the sole right to negotiate concessions
for projects the government wanted built. Initially,
if a conceptual proposal was strong, the proposers were
given six months to try to negotiate contract terms. A
number of real projects got built that way, generating
strong investor and contractor interest. Initial terms
were generous; not outrageous but good enough to open
the right doors.
The new approach is to inject as much
competition as possible into selection of the
concessionaires although exclusivity is still granted
to firms with truly innovative solutions. Also, the
deals are not as rich because they do not need to be to
attract contractor and investor interest.
6. With the exception of the North-South highway, most
of the projects were relatively small, 50 million to 60
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million in U.S. dollars. Both sides learned how to
structure risks and rewards on strong, stand alone
projects that could be financed locally. They did not
go for the large, prestigious projects first. If they
had, they probably would have failed.
More generally, Malaysia succeeded where many
others have not because of the stability of its
government; the size and sophistication of its capital
market; and the low interest rates on borrowed capital.
3.8 Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai Superhighway (Phase I)1
3.8.1 Outline of the project
The Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai Superhighway (GSZ) is
located in the Guangdong Province of the People's Republic of
China. The project consists of two phases. Phase I will
link Shenzhen/HongKong area with Guangzhou, and Phase II will
link Guangzhou with the Zhuhai/Macau area. Both phases will
be connected by the proposed Guangzhou Ring Road. Phase I
shown in Figure 3-8 consists of 122.8 km of dual three-lane
toll roads with 15 interchanges. This project is being
developed under BOT by a joint venture with Hopewell China
Development (Superhighway) Limited and the Guangdong
1 The information in this section is based on the following documents:
Green, Michael, S.G. Warburg Research: Hopewell HoldinQs Ltd, S.G.
Warburg Securities, November 1993. Pyle (1992). Pyle, Thomas H.
"Private Financing of Chinese Power," Infocast conference, Private
Power in China, 8 February 1994. Goldstein, Carl, "Skirting the
potholes," Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 December 1992. Goldstein,
Carl, "Open Sesame," Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 December 1993.
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Provincial Highway Construction Company, which represents the
Guangdong provincial government. The concession period is 30
years beginning from the expected construction completion
date of June, 1994. In addition, the joint venture is
developing commercial centers at the ten of fifteen
interchanges. Each center will have a gross floor area of
approximately 900,000 square feet.
nzhen-
hway
rchange
of Guangzhou-
Shenzhen-Zhuhal Superhighway
Figure 3-8
Layout of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai
Superhighway (Phase I)1
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1 Green (1993).
The project cost of Phase I is estimated at US$ 1,2
billion through HK$ 1.56 billion equity and US$ 800 million
international limited recourse syndicated loans and a RMB 730
million provided by the People's Bank of China. The cost of
the commercial centers is estimated at HK$ 2.0 billion and
will be funded by the Hopewell Group.
3.8.2 Project structure
A: Joint Venture Agreement
B: Loan Agreement
C: Turnkey Contract with completion guarantee
D: Shortfall guarantee
E: Shortfall payment guarantee
F: Shareholding
Figure 3-9
Project Structure of the GSZ Superhighway
3.8.3 Land acquisition
Hopewell has negotiated with land holders for
constructing the Superhighway. The last piece of land was
handed over in February, 1994, almost six years after the
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first contract had been signed. Hopewell realized that the
money they paid for the land had not been filtered down to
the local level and complained to senior provincial
officials. Hopewell's Wu explained "Everything is highly
negotiable. You just have to pay a little more money, then
get some senior officials to clobber someone" (Goldstein,
1993). As a result of these experiences, Hopewell turned the
land acquisition responsibility over to the provincial
government in the next contract of Phase II between Guangdong
and Zhuhai.
3.8.4 Construction
The construction of Phase I was separated into three
parts in August 1992. Hopewell has been responsible for the
construction of the central 80 km, and GPHCC has been
responsible for the sections at each end. In order to win
the contract of the Superhighway project, Hopewell accepted
the joint venture with the Chinese company in 1987 against
its will. Officials of the Chinese company proved to be
"more interested in the size of their dormitories and whether
they had air-conditioning and color television" than in
efficient operation and early completion, Wu says (Goldstein,
1992).
The research done by S.G. Warburg in August 1993
included a two day site visit, and the conclusion of some
important aspects regarding construction progress and project
management.
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* Construction delay
Construction progress is not only behind its original
target date of June, 1993 but also behind its contractual
completion date of June, 1994. The construction of the
approximately 21 km (13 miles) of elevated section and
elevated interchanges throughout the highway is progressing
slowly. Therefore, Warburg estimated that actual completion
for full toll collection might be possible in late 1994. In
addition, Warburg faulted Hopewell's lack of detailed project
scheduling and budgeting. Their lack in project scheduling
is also obvious from their unrealistic statements of early
completion.
* Possible cost overrun
Cost overruns occurred for two main reasons. The first
reason was the design change of a 6 km portion in Section B
near Xinqiao and Changan. This portion was not originally
designed as elevated, but elevation was necessary because of
poor soil conditions and possible flooding. The second
reason was the soaring construction costs, especially
concerning RMB material costs of steel reinforced bars and
cement during 18 months from the beginning of 1992 to mid
1993. Steel reinforcing increased in price approximately
140% in RMB. Hopewell's exposure to the soaring RMB
construction costs were fortunately reduced by Hopewell's
payment for construction materials in US dollars. US dollar
steel prices increased approximately 26% from July 1992 to
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March 1993, and cement prices rose only marginally. However,
it is possible that construction costs have increased as much
as 65%.
Referring to Hopewell's Sept. 27, 1993, public statement
about its expenditures for the superhighway, Warburg
indicated that it was clear that the total cost could exceed
the original budget substantially.
Lack of evidence in quality control
The quality control for the reinforced concrete and road
surface is insufficient. The evidence for such a statement
includes the usage of welding in the structuring of
reinforced bars, the too-great concentration of reinforced
bars which might prevent concrete from being poured at some
structuring junctions, and the nonexistence of on-site
laboratories or test holes for density and elasticity tests
for road construction. The lack of quality control may
increase maintenance costs and cause a loss of toll revenue
which would result when roads are closed for repairs.
3.8.5 Interchanges
Warburg also made some observations regarding the
construction of the interchanges. The summary of the
interchanges is shown in Table 3-19.
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Table 3-19
Summary of Interchanges in GSZ1
Number of interchanges
Number of commercial interchanges
Budget cost
Scheduled completion
Stage of completion
Estimated completion
Co-operation period
Profit share
Gross floor area of accommodation
:14
:10
:HK$ 1149 million
:1995
:30-35%
:1995
:30 years
:80%
:approx. 7.25
million square feet
Hopewell will only receive 40% of the toll for ten years
and 30% after ten years. Its main profit will come from the
commercial developments of the interchanges. The
profitability of the commercial facilities on the
interchanges depends on the traffic of the Superhighway.
Warburg concluded that it will need longer than is generally
appreciated to achieve rentals of $15 psf and full occupancy
for the following reasons:
* Each interchange is far from urban areas
* The spread of private vehicles in China is still slow
* The traffic on the Superhighway alone is not enough to
achieve the full occupancy of the commercial facilities
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1 Green (1993).
In addition, the traffic on the Superhighway might be
affected by a new highway that could be constructed in the
near future, around 2010. Also, modern commercial facilities
might be constructed near the urban area or close to the
outdated centers. These are serious concerns, as early
traffic increases and full occupancy of the shopping centers
are important for the profitability of the Superhighway
project.
3.8.6 Financing
The Superhighway is financed by equity and debt through
international and Chinese loans. The costs and sources of
the financing are shown in Table 3-20 and 3-21.
Table 3-20
Cost of GSZ: (US$ million)
Land acquisition 132
Total construction 731
Interest on bank loan 202
Interest on loan from shareholders 78
Administration and contract cost 63
Total 1,206
Table 3-21
Sources of Financing for GSZ: (US$ million)
Equity of the superhighway
joint venture 90
Loan from shareholders 129
Bank syndicated loan 800
Value of land acquired 187
Total 1,206
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3.8.6.1 Bank syndicated loan
The terms and conditions of the Bank syndicated loan are
shown in Table 3-22. Because of the country risk in China,
it was necessary to obtain some guarantees and insurance from
the Chinese government in order to make the project bankable.
Political risk was insured by a project guarantee offered by
GITIC. In addition, political insurance from the People's
Insurance Company of China was arranged.
Summary of
Borrower:
Loan amount:
Interest rates:
Loan release
schedule:
Repayments:
Table 3-22
the Bank Syndicated Loans for GSZI
Hopewell China Development (Superhighway)
Limited
Term loan facility US$ 720 million
Revolving facility US$ 80 million
Pre-completion 1.5% above LIBOR
Post-completion 1.375% above LIBOR
Year Amount (US$ million)
1991 109
1992 224
1993 264
1994 123
720
29 unequal quarterly installments
starting on June 30, 1995:
Year Payment per Total annual payment
year (US$ million)
1995 3 30
1996 4 60
1997 4 70
1998 4 90
1999 4 110
2000 4 130
2001 4 150
2002 2 80
2003 (Revolver) 80
800
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1 Pyle (1992).
Performance test:
At the end of each annual period. To be satisfied if:
1. the Debt Service Coverage Ratio ("DSCR") exceeds
1.1:1;
2. traffic consultants forecast shows that future volume
and revenue projections for the immediately succeeding
annual period will meet the requirements of Point 3
just below;
3. the projected DSCR, under exchange and interest rates
and currency convertibility assumptions determined by
the agent and using the traffic consultant's forecasts
of revenues, exceeds 1.1:1 in the immediately
succeeding annual period;
4. a prepayment of not less than US$ 25 million has been
made out of surplus revenues from the project in that
annual period, and;
5. all sums outstanding under the Shortfall Payment
guarantee have been repaid.
Security:
Pre-completion
1. Completion guarantee: joint and several guarantee by
the contractor consortium
2. Contractors Sponsors' guarantee: several guarantee by
GITIC and Hopewell Holdings to make up any shortfall
under the Completion Guarantee
3. Investment Insurance: special insurance taken out
with the People's Insurance Company of China covering
political risks like wars, civil unrest, changes in
policy, nationalization and transfer risks
4. Hopewell undertaking and Guarantee: Hopewell Holdings
undertakes and guarantees certain obligations of the
borrower, the joint venture company and the agent
unless these are not covered by any other security
arrangements
5. Security deed: Assignment of insurance, guarantees
and agreements
6. Charge of assets: Charge over assets and bank
accounts and contracts of the Joint Venture Co.
Post completion
1. Operating Expenses Support Agreement: joint and
several undertakings by Party A and Hopewell to makeup
shortfalls of the operating income for payment of the
operating expenses
2. Shortfall Payment Guarantee: guarantee by GITIC for
the joint venture Co's obligations
Security Accounts: All revenues to be paid into them
Covenants:
1. Negative Pledge
2. No dividends or repayment of subordinated loans to be
made until Performance Test is met
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3. No change in ownership
4. No new borrowing without authorization
5. Adequate insurance at all times
6. New toll proposals subject to prior consent of
lenders
7. Event of Default if project completion later than 30
June, 1996
Law: Hong Kong
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Chapter IV
Comparative Study of the BOT Cases
4.1 Introduction
This chapter summarizes the major project features of
the cases described in Chapter III. Next, the achievements of
objectives presented in chapter II are evaluated. Finally,
detailed risk allocations for each project are examined and
critical factors are discerned.
4.2 Project feature
Tables 4-1 and 4-2 were compiled to clarify and
summarize the similarities and differences of four power
plant projects and three toll road projects.
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Table 4-1
Comparisons of Features in Power Projects
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Shajiao B Shajiao C Navotas I Pagbilao
Location People's People's Philippines Philippines
Republic of Republic of
China China
Type Coal-fired Coal-fired Oil-fired power Coal-fired
power plant power plant plant power plant
Capacity (MW) 350 * 2 660 * 3 210 367.5 * 2
Cost (US$ 513 1,966 41 933
million)
Concession 10 years 20 years 12 years 25 years
Period (1988-1998) (1996-2016) (1991-2003) (1996-2021)
Development Joint Venture Joint Venture Project Energy
procedure Contract Contract (HEL; Agreement (HEPC Conversion
(HPCL & SEDC) 60 % & Shajiao & NAPOCOR) Agreement (HPPC
Power; 40 %) & NAPOCOR)
Concession Hopewell's Joint Venture Hopewell' s Hopewell's
campany subsidiary: between subsidiary: subsidiary:
HPCL Hopewell' s HEPC HPPC, and
subsidiary: MLAs' equity
HEL, and participation
Chinese State
owned Cacpany
Government State owned State owned Government Government
representative campany: SEDC company: owned entity: owned entity:
Shajiao Power/ NAPOCOR NAPOCOR
GGPC
Construction Under Under Under Under
and operation operations Very constructions operations construction:
status successful possible cost Construction Construction
overrun and delayed, but delayed because
construction Very successful of the late
delay in operation start
Table 4-2
Comparisons of Features in Toll Road Projects
Second Stage North-South Guangzhou-
Expressway Highway (NSH) Shenzhen-
(SES) Zhuhai
Superhighway(GSZ)
Location Thailand Malaysia People's
Republic of
China
Type Elevated urban Toll highway Toll highway
toll expressway
Length 32 km 504 km 122.8 km
Cost (US$ 1,100 2,300 1,206
million) (originally
1,300)
Concession 30 years 30 years 30 years
Period (1990-2020) (1988-2018) (1994-2024)
Development Concession Concession Joint Venture
procedure Agreemnent Agreement Agreement
(ETA and BECL) (Government and (Chinese agency
UEM) and Hopewell's
subsidiary)
Concession Bangkok PLUS led by Joint venture
company Expressway Co. United (Hopewell
Ltd. (BECL) led Engineers China)
by Japanese Malaysia
Kumagai Gumi
Government Expressway and Malaysian Joint venture
representative Rapid Transit Government (Guangdong
Authority of Provincial
Thailand (ETA) Highway
Construction
Cctpany: GPHCC)
Construction First sectors Under Under
and operation have been construction: construction:
status completed. But, Expected Construction
in August 1993, construction completion will
they were completion date be delayed
expropriated by delayed from
the government 1992 to 1995
Similarities in all projects
* Needed projects by governments
* Bureaucratic nature of the government agencies
Similarities in power plant projects
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* High coefficient of utilization
* Substantial government and sponsor supports
* Project types using established technology: Three projects
are coal-fired and one is a thermal power plant. Both types
use established technology.
Similarities in toll road projects
* Large project sizes
* Long concession periods (30 years): much longer than power
plant projects
* Problems in land acquisition or/and construction: SES and
GSZ have had problems in land acquisition, and NSH and GSZ
have problems in cost overruns and delay of construction.
Differences-in power plant and toll road projects
* The amount of government support: Power plant projects seem
to be better supported by governments than road projects in
terms of risk allocation. For example, in power projects,
currency exchange risks are partially guaranteed by US
dollar payment for electricity purchase, but are only
guaranteed in NSH in road projects.
Differences in power plant proiects
* Construction and operation status: the first two projects
Shajiao B and Navotas I, are operated smoothly, but the
other two projects have some problems in construction.
Shajiao C is expected to have a cost overrun because of some
problems in quality control and the necessity for repetitive
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work. Pagbilao has been behind schedule because of
litigation with local people who are against the
construction.
* Project sizes: Project sizes vary from 210 to 1980 MW.
* Concession periods: Concession periods vary from 10 to 25
years.
* Contract type: Joint Venture Contract is used for Chinese
projects; a Chinese state-owned company is contributing in
equity for Shajiao C, and Project Agreement and Energy
Conversion Agreement are used for the other two Philippine
projects respectively.
* Government entity: the Chinese joint venture partners are
state owned entities, but the Philippines' NAPOCOR is a
government utility which had been responsible for all
electric power plant projects.
Differences in toll road projects
* Project type: SES is an urban expressway, unlike the other
two local highway projects. Because of its construction in
the congested city of Bangkok, more proficiency was required
of the SES construction management than of the management of
the other two projects.
" Projects' geographical requirements: SES is situated in a
small area in Bangkok, whereas the other two projects are
much more extensive. Because of the distances involved, NSH
and GSZ needed to manage their projects with a number of
similar construction teams. It was important for all of
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these teams to manage contractors to complete their sections
on time.
* Development procedure: SES and NSH are being developed
through a concession agreement, but GSZ is being developed
through a joint venture agreement
* Concession company: BECL is managed by an experienced
international contractor, Kumagai; the other two projects'
concession and joint venture companies, however, are managed
by contractors who do not have prior experience in large
highway projects.
* Government representatives: Especially in GSZ, the
bureaucratic characteristics of GPHCC, a Chinese joint
venture partner, made it difficult for Hopewell to manage
the project efficiently.
* Expropriation of SES by Thai government
4.3 Achievements of the objectives
As I described in Chapter II, the general objectives of
governments in developing countries are categorized in terms
of the following: additionality, efficiency gains, government
risk reduction, positive externalities, technology transfer,
enhancement of political environment, and rapidity of
development. On the other hand, the objective of the private
sectors, including sponsors and lenders is to achieve a high
rate of return on their projects. Although we must wait
through long concession periods of 30 years to evaluate
exactly the success of each project in reaching both public
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and private goals, we are able to present a brief comparison
of the achievements of these objectives so far in Table 4-3
and 4-4.
Table 4-3
The Achievements of the Objectives of BOT in Power Projects
Objectives Degree of achievements of The bases of evaluation
the objective
High Medium Low
Government All Chinese and the Philippine government
Additionality simply lack the funds for construction.
In addition, all projects utilize
offshore financing.
Efficiency Navo. Hopewell imported second hand units from
gains by cost U.S. to reduce costs in Navotas.
reduction Shajiao B, C, and Pagbilao--Information
is limited.
Efficiency B, C All projects except Navotas have/had
gains by Navo., international turnkey consortiums which
management (Pag.) are much efficient than Chinese agencies
improvement and Philippines utilities. In terms of
operation, Shajiao B was managed by an
international operator to make Chinese
learn the operation. Pagbilao will also
be operated by an international
operator.
Government risk All All projects have been efficiently
reduction constructed and managed by governmental
view point. However, both governments
share substantial risks, including
currency exchange, and the equity
participation in Shajiao C.
Positive All Power plant projects fundamentally
externalities posses the possibilities for further
economic expansion. In addition, a
Chinese BOT might improve China's
investment climate if they are
successful.
Technology All These two countries' technologies are
transfer about 10 years behind than those of
developed countries
Political Navo., B, C Power shortage in Manila is a serious
environment Pag. problem. Therefore, even the President
enhancement is involved in making BOT power project
successful.
Rapidity of B, Navo. Shajiao B completed construction 11
development (C, months ahead of the schedule. Navotas
Pag.) delayed its completion, but two of three
units were commissioned ahead of the
schedule.
Private sectors B, (C, Hopewell expects high returns with early
High return Navo., Pag.) completion of the project and a high
coefficient of availability. Shajiao C
expects a major cost overrun. Pagbilao
delayed its construction start
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Table 4-4
The Achievements of the Objectives of BOT
in Toll Road Projects
Objectives Degree of achievements of The bases of evaluation
the objective
High Medium Low
Government SES, SES and NSH were originally started by
Additionality NSH, governments, but they stopped them
GSZ because of the lack of funds. All
projects utilize offshore finances.
Efficiency SES GSZ NSH SES--Cost management by experienced
gains by cost project manager
reduction GSZ--Cost overrun is expected.
NSH--Government monetary supports NSH
substantially. The construction cost
was
Efficiency SES GSZ NSH SES--Kumagai completed construction on
gains by time.
management GSZ--Problem in the incentives of
improvement Chinese contractors. Join venture
separated the project to two parts, and
are being managed by themselves.
Government risk SES GSZ NSH SES--Efficient project management by
reduction private sector
GSZ--Government share some risks by
Joint Venture, also many shareholder
supports were provided by the government
NSH--Government strongly supports the
project
Positive GSZ, SES GSZ--Sponsor develops the area along the
externalities NSH road, including shopping centers
NSH--It developed the local capital
market
Technology SES NSH, No new technology was used for
transfer GSZ construction.
Political SES GSZ, New government utilized SES for their
environment NSH popularity.
enhancement
Rapidity of SES, These projects cannot be provided
development GSZ, quickly without BOT
NSH
Private sectors (GSZ) - SES(ex- It is too early to define expected
High return (NSH) propri- returns. however, Hopewell expects high
ated) returns because of the actual traffic
increase far beyond their feasibility
studies
From this brief comparison, it is obvious that power
plant projects have been much more successful than highway
projects. Most of the government objectives have been
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accomplished and a high return for private sectors has been
realized so far.
Power projects
All projects generally meet the objectives so far as is
shown in Table 4-3. The main objectives of the BOT of the
power development project will be their "Additionality" with
which an urgently needed electricity supply increase will be
realized. From the view point of the private sector, the
profitabilities of Shajiao B and Navotas I seem to meet their
expectations. On the other hand, Shajiao C and Pagbilao may
have a cost overrun and a completion delay. The potential
for construction cost overruns in power plant projects are
considered smaller than road projects for the following
reasons: large components of the plants are sub-contracted
with set prices, generator units are standardized, electrical
and mechanical equipment is largely imported, assembled,
tested, and commissioned within a relatively standardized
civil structure (Green, 1993). In this sense, achieving BOT
objectives, from both the public and the private sectors'
view point, will be easier in power plant projects than in
road projects.
Shajiao B
Shajiao B was completed 11 months before the scheduled
deadline and Hopewell earned an early completion bonus. The
success was mainly because of efficient construction
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management by Costains, a reputed international contractor,
despite several anticipated problems described in the case
study. The operation of the plant is going well with the
Chinese operator which has taken over the operation after
international operator trained the local employees.
* Shajiao C
The rapid construction, with pressure to get early
completion incentives, has been managed by Hopewell's
subsidiary which had less management skills than Costains.
Therefore, some quality deficiency of the construction has
been revealed and caused cost overruns for some repetitive
work (Green, 1993).
* Navotas I
This project is small and simple compared to other power
projects. After the success of Shajiao B, Hopewell
strategically contracted this project aiming to contract
larger Pagbilao. Although the construction of the plant was
delayed 2 months mainly because of equipment which was
defective on delivery, it is operated successfully.
* Pagbilao
Pagbilao started construction in April 1993 behind the
schedule because of the litigation with local residents. In
addition, Green (1993) reported that the quality control of
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the project, which included the usage of sub standard
aggregates, was poor.
Toll Road projects
* SES
The project generally achieved its objectives as is
shown in Table 4-4 before the government expropriated it.
The success was mainly the result of efficient construction
management and an appropriate amount of government support.
* GSZ
GSZ is having problems in the formation in its
construction joint venture. Although the government's joint
venture partner is very supportive of the project, the
partner's incentives are not shared by its own contractors.
The contractors lack the incentives for efficient project
management and are not concerned about any delays in
construction. Further, Hopewell seems to lack project
management skills (Green, 1993). Therefore, in spite of the
strong support, both from the government partner and the
private sector, standards of efficiency have not been
realized as expected.
* NSH
NSH is less successful, from the government point of
view, than other projects because of excessive Malaysian
government's distortion of the project. The Malaysian
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government could have executed the project more economically
and efficiently if politics had not been involved in its
awarding process.
However, all of these projects have great possibilities
of high return and positive externalities because of the
expected rapid increase of traffic volume in each region.
4.4 Risk allocation
In order to clarify the differences in risk allocation
among the four power plant projects and the three highway
projects, and analyze the appropriate risk sharing, I have
compiled Table 4-5, 4-6 and analyzed the critical points for
success of BOT.
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Table 4-5
Comparisons of Risk Allocation in Power Projects
Shajiao B
Yes
Yes,
responsible
for increased
costs caused
by Force
majeure and
any other
reasons with
subordinated
loans and
other methods
No. But,
GITIC
insurance
guarantees
SEDC's
obligation
Legal
Changes
in law
Force
majeure
controll-
able by
governme-
nt
Governme-
nt' s
exceptio-
nal
action
(default)
Sponsor's
performa-
nce
Land
acquisit-
ion &
Transmis-
sion line
Contract
efficien-
cy
Technical
Credit
risk on
developi-
ng the
project
Yes
No
Yes
No
Shajiao CResolution
or risk
allocation
Political
risk
Insurance
Privileges
in tax
exemptions
Government
guarantee
Government
guarantee
Performan-
guarantee
Sponsor's
Equity
participa-
tion
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Navotas I
No. But, th
risk is
covered by
another
aqreement
Six year tax
holiday.
Full
exemption
from custom
duties and
taxes
Give
Hopewell a
right to
sell out the
plant to the
government
Give
Hopewell a
right to
sell out the
plant to the
government
Yes.
Guarantees
NAPOCOR's
obligations
Yes
Yes
IFC, ADB,
ADB co-
financing
Pagbilao
No. But, the
risk is
covered by
another
agreement
Six year tax
holiday. Full
exemption
from custom
duties and
taxes
Give Hopewell
a right to
sell out the
plant to the
government
Give Hopewell
a right to
sell out the
plant to the
government
Yes.
Guarantees
NAPOCOR's
obligations
Existence of
the Trustee
Yes
IFC, ADB,
CDC, JEXIM,
USEXIM
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Project
phase
All
phases
Develo -
pment
phase
Risk
Political
Yes
Yes (Equity
participation
of the public
partner)
Comfort
letter from
the
provincial
government
No. But,
GITIC
insurance
guarantees
Shajiao
Power's
obligation
Joint
venture
with
public
partner
Yes
Provision
by the
public
sector
Competiti-
ve bidding
Tradition-
al
construct-
ion
methods
Participa-
tion of
MLA, and
ECA
Reliable
track
record of
parent
companies
f
I I
MMMMMMý Mý
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Table 4-5
Comparisons of Risk Allocation in Power Projects (continued)
Project Risk Resolution Shajiao B Shajiao C Navotas I Pagbilao
phase or risk
allocation
Constr- Completi- Turnkey Yest Yes: Yes: Yes:
uction on, cost contractor International International Hopewell's International
phase overrun, Consortium Consortium subsidiary Consortium
and (Slipform)
quality
Project Costains (an Hopewell's Hopewell's Hopewell's
management international subsidiary: subsidiary: subsidiary:
contractor) HTL Slipform HTL
under
Hopewell
Completi- Early Yes. Yes. Behind the Yes.
on, cost completion 100 % HPCL HEL: 80 % schedule 100 % HPPC
overrun incentives (HK$ 395 mm, Shajiao: 20 %
RMB 11.6 mm)
Sponsor's Yes, from Yes. HHL and - Yes. Sponsors
shortfall shareholders Shajiao Power agree to
loan US$ 250 mm provide
subordinated
loans up to
US$ 200 mm
Contract- Guarantee No No No No
or's by
performa- sponsors
nce
Operat- Cash flow No second No No No No
ion facility
phase guarantee ,
Concession No No No No
to operate
existing
facility
Minimum Purchase half Purchase in Purchase all Purchase all
electrici- in RMB, and part US$ and NAPOCOR NAPOCOR
ty half in US$ in part RMB requested in requested inpurchase US$ & Peso US$ & Peso
Security - Yes - Yes
account
Currency Government No, but No, but No, but No, but
exchange guarantee payment is payment is payment is payment is
rate partially partially partially partially
done in US$ done in US$ done in US$ done in US$
Interest Government No No No No
rate guarante
Maintena- Shortfall SEDC will GITIC
nce and guarantee make provides
operation by subordinated guarantee in
cost sponsors loan to HPCL respect of
overrun (max. HK$ 500 the
million) performance
of the
operator
Experienc- International No. Chinese No. International
ed Operator at state owned Hopewell's Operator will
operator the company subsidiary be selected
beginning, (HPML)
but changed
to a local
company
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Table 4-6
Comparisons of Risk Allocation in Toll Road Projects
Project Risk Resolution Second Stage North-South Guangzhou-
phase or risk Expressway Highway Shenzhen-
allocation Zhuhai
Superhighway
All Political Political No No Yes. People's
phases risk insurance
Insurance company of
China covers
it
Joint No (Concession No (Concession Yes
venture with Agreement) Agreement)
public
partner .
Legal Privileges eight year - Same tax
in tax corporate tax exemptions
exemptions relief after because of the
earning the joint venture
revenue
Changes in Goverment Yes Yes Changes in
law guarantee policy is
covered by an
insurance
Force Government Yes - Yes (The same
majeure guarantee insurance for
the political
risk)
Governmen- Guarantee by Yes (by Yes No, but GITIC
t' s government remedies) insurance
exceptional guarantees it
action
Sponsor's Sponsor' s Yes No Yes
performance equity
participatio
n
Developmn- Land Provision by Yes, including Yes No (Hopewell
ent phase acquisition public subsidy did)
sector
Contract Campetitive Yes. Yes.
efficiency bidding Campetitive Comnpetitive
but only in 2 but only in
Campanies few cmpanies
Technical Design by Yes Yes Yes
traditional
construction
methods
Unknown Government Yes
subsurface remedies
condition
credit risk Participati- ADB provided a No No
an on of MLA, loan and
developing and ECA equity of US$
the project 40 million
Reliable Yes No Yes
track record
of parent
c panies
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Table 4-6
Comparison of Risk Allocation in Toll Road Projects
(continued)
Project Risk Resolution Second Stage North-South Guangzhou-
phase or risk Expressway Highway Shenzhen-
allocation Zhuhai
Superhighway
Construc- Ccupletion, Turnkey Yes, with Yes (PLUS Yes, with
tion cost contractor Kumagai's contracted completion
phase overrun, warranty and with 40 sub guarantee
and quality performance contractors)
bonds
Project Kumagai Pengurusan -
management Lebuhraya
Berhad (PL);
Local
Canpletion, Early - - Yes
cost completion
overrun incentives
Sponsor's Construction - Yes from both
shortfall warranty by Hopewell and a
loan Kumagai government
agency
Contractor' Guarantee by Construction - GITIC and
s sponsors warranty fran Hopewell
performance Kumagai guarantees its
performance
Operation Cash flow No second No No No
phase (toll facility
revenue) guarantee
Concession Yes, and share Yes. Toll is No (New
to operate the toll collected by highway)
existing together PLUS for their
facility profit
Minim•- No Yes No
traffic
guarantee by
government
Security Yes. Toll - Yes
account collection
bank
Currency Government No Yes No
exchange guarantee
rate
Interest Government No Yes No
rate guarantee
Maintenance Shortfall - - Yes
and guarantee by
operation sponsors
cost
overrun
Internation- No. Government - Joint venture
al operator agency
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All phases
Political risk
In the power projects, no special political insurance is
procured by the projects, but in Shajiao B, Navotas, and
Pagbilao, governments guaranteed force majeure risks which
include political risks.
With regard to road projects, in GSZ, because of China's
paramount political risk, special investment insurance was
taken out with the People's Insurance Company of China
covering political risks like war, civil unrest, changes in
policy, and nationalization. GSZ consists of a joint venture
with a Chinese partner which might have been helpful from the
view point of political risk reduction; however, the joint
venture partner was incompetent in construction, and caused
the project to be delayed. In SES and NSH, such insurance
was not taken by sponsors.
In developing Asian countries, political risks still
exist despite their economic expansion; therefore, securing
political risks with insurance and the participation of
various international and local investors, including MLAs and
ECAs is recommendable. When SES was funded, foreign banks
were invited to participate in the project. The reason was
not because their money was needed but because the local Thai
banks thought their presence would help the project progress.
However, the participation did not work welli
1 Sender, Henny, "Don't bank on it," Far Eastern Economic Review, 24
February 1994.
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* Legal and force majeure risks
The governments have been generally supportive of all
seven projects in sharing these risks because they need such
projects and lack their own funds. The Philippines,
Thailand, and Chinese governments offered tax privileges to
project companies. All governments except China guaranteed
their agencies' performances and their unchanges in laws. In
the Chinese cases, GITIC insurance guaranteed the agencies'
performance. With regards to the force majeure risks, the
Philippines government guaranteed to buyout Navotas and
Pagbilao if the force majeure was within reasonable control
of the government. In Shajiao C, government guaranteed the
cost increase if it occurred by force majeure.
* Sponsor's performance risk
All sponsors except UEM in NSH contributed to the
equity. In NSH, the sponsor raised all equity in the capital
market. This is very unusual in BOT in developing countries.
The established capital market enabled the sponsors to
execute the project without investing their own money. This
is, in a sense, considered dangerous for other participants
such as lenders in terms of securing proper management for
the project. However, the utilization of capital market
should be considered in other developing countries.
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Development phase
* Land acquisition risk
Government entities were responsible for land
acquisition except GSZ. SES and GSZ had problems in land
acquisition. In SES's case, the government agency was
responsible for land acquisition, but a change in the land
evaluation basis delayed the acquisition. The delay affected
the construction schedule of SES. In GSZ's case, Hopewell
was responsible for acquiring the right of way. The
negotiation for land acquisition in China was extremely
difficult and time consuming because of the involvement of
bureaucracy and because of the Chinese culture's emphasis on
the man rather than the rule. Therefore, it is reasonable to
expect that the government partner will be responsible for
land acquisition risk in BOT. Further, it is especially
important for sponsors to choose suitable partners who can
manage the acquisition punctually.
* Bidding risk
In Shajiao B, only Hopewell bid on the project.
Hopewell also negotiated Navotas I extensively. On the other
hand, competitive bidding existed in the three road projects,
although I wonder whether other qualified bidders were able
to participate, because substantial time and money are
required to bid on such huge projects. For this reason, I
believe that the efficiency gains of competitive bidding were
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not realized. On the other hand, the bidders were probably
shielded from bidding risks.
* Technical risk
Two major technical risks are involved in BOT projects.
First is the risk in using new construction technology. It
is important to secure the construction cost by using assured
technology. For example, in SES, segmental construction-was
used and succeeded in reducing costs and construction time.
On the contrary, the Don Muang project in Thailand, which
used the new technology of Dywidag method of Germany,
experienced cost overruns and construction delays. The
second risk is unknown subsurface conditions which have the
potential to change construction methods and costs
substantially. Therefore, they must be carefully
investigated. If this condition has not been assured,
something must be done about it. For example, in SES, the
government allowed remedies such as changes of revenue
sharing proportions and toll rates, if different subsurface
conditions prevail.
* Credit risk
MLAs and ECAs' participation is very supportive to
enhancing the credit of the project for the lenders. The
sponsor's track record is also important. In the Philippines
power projects, several MLAs and ECAs participated with co-
financing. Their participation enhanced the credit of the
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projects. On the other hand, only the ADB participated in
SES in road projects. MLAs seem more interested in power
than in highway projects. With regard to the track record of
the sponsors, reliable track records in similar projects are
essential for credit enhancement and the success of BOT.
Hopewell's Shajiao B and UEM's NSH was exceptional because of
the Citibank's positive loan participation for Shajiao B and
excuse of government support for NSH.
Construction phase
Construction completion and cost overrun risk
First, this risk was guaranteed by turnkey contractors
in all cases. Therefore, the participants were literally
insured from the problems of cost overrun and construction
delay. However, if completion was substantially delayed, the
loss could be much larger than the contractors' liquidated
damage payments or other compensations. Therefore, the
selection of an efficient contractor is important despite the
existence of turnkey contracts. For example, NSH and GSZ had
problems with their contractors' overall construction
management skills, including scheduling, budgeting, and
quality control. The turnkey contractors in these projects
are generally local contractors. Even though the
construction technologies in these projects are common, it
seems difficult for such contractors to be responsible for
their obligation to keep to construction scheduling. In
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addition, Chinese contractors in GSZ lack incentives to
complete construction on schedule.
Second, the risks could be partially covered by the
sponsor's project management ability. However, if the
sponsor is not experienced, the risks can be covered by
efficient project management company. For example, Hopewell
had no experience when it implemented Shajiao B. Wu said
Hopewell's inexperience in power projects was not problem
because of its experience in every component of civil works;
also the division of labor with mechanical and electrical
suppliers enabled the project (Tiong, 1992). However, in
reality, Shajiao B was managed by an internationally reputed
project management company. As a result, the project was
completed 11 months before the specified deadline, and
Hopewell earned an early completion bonus. In addition, in
SES, although the project was technically more difficult than
the other two road projects, construction went smoothly
because of efficient project control by the construction
manager, Kumagai. On the contrary, in Shajiao C and GSZ,
Hopewell is managing the project with its own subsidiaries,
and major problems are being revealed. Green (1993) reported
on their expected cost overruns, project delays, and on the
low quality of the construction.
Third, early completion incentives could be used for
decreasing the risks. They were used for major Hopewell
projects to protect their projects from construction delays.
Although the concept encourages contractors to complete the
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project as early as possible, it would be dangerous to pursue
only the incentives. Green (1993) reported Hopewell's staff
problems were concentrated construction and project
management activities as follows:
* High staff turnover ratio; approximately 40% p.a..
* Resignation of at least 10 engineers at Shajiao C since
the beginning of the project; The reason is their lack of
quality control because they are too concentrated on
construction progress in order to get large personal
bonuses which have been promised for early completion of
the project.
* Senior management's disability to grasp the reality of
the practical, logistical, and financial challenges which
are being experienced in the forefront.
Therefore, it is especially important to employ a
qualified construction manager and to set a realistic
completion target date based on precise scheduling.
Furthermore, it is especially important to maintain the
quality of the construction because the concessionaire has to
maintain power plants and highways for long concession
periods. Quality of construction affects the maintenance
cost directly. In SES, Kumagai was the project manager for
the entire project, and it seemed that the quality was well
maintained. On the other hand, in GSZ, the Chinese and
Hopewell are separately managing the construction, but S.G.
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Warburg reported that there was no evidence of quality
control on their job sites. In case something happens like
structural failure, it would cost more than such incentives
could bring in.
Fourth, the sponsor's shortfall loan and a warranty were
employed to insure completion risks. For example, in two
large power projects Shajiao C and Pagbilao, sponsors agreed
to provide more than US$ 200 million shortfall loans to meet
possible.contractors' funding insufficiency. Projects in
China are insured by shortfall loans both from Hopewell and
Chinese entities because of the joint venture. On the other
hand, Kumagai warranted the completion in SES.
Contractor's performance risk
In the power projects, international turnkey contractor
consortiums, including suppliers, have been responsible for
the projects except in the small Navotas I project.
Therefore, sponsors did not have to insure the contractors'
risks. However, in the road projects, because of the number
of small contractors participating compared to those in the
power projects, sponsors' guarantees seemed to be required.
For example, Kumagai warranted the contractors performance in
SES. Also, GITIC insurance and Hopewell guaranteed the
contractors' performance risks in GSZ. This guarantee is
important so that lenders can be assured of project
completion.
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Operation phase
* Cash flow, currency, and interest rate risk
China and the Philippines lack electricity compared to
other developing Asian countries, and need it not only for
their economic expansion but also in their daily life.
Therefore, in general, governments are very supportive for
power projects. There are three similar features in the
packages of their power projects:
1. Governments supply coal or oil to the plant
2. Governments guarantee minimum electricity purchase
both in local currency and US dollars.
3. Governments do not use rate of return regulations
However, these features are minimum requirements to
realize BOTs in developing countries. In other words, only
the energy conversion portion is accountable on the BOT basis
in power development projects. The portion of supplying raw
materials to the plant and the distribution of electricity
are too risky for the private sectors because they usually
cannot control them. Therefore, such portions should be
separated from BOT energy development projects. In addition,
electricity purchase should be done in hard currency, except
for the portion used for local payment, because the project
company cannot afford currency fluctuation risks.
In road projects, the Malaysian government extensively
supported NSH in this phase by providing an extensive
security package. The government guaranteed minimum traffic
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volume, foreign currency exchange rate, and interest rate.
With these guarantees, the operation risks are almost
entirely transferred from the private sector to the
government. On the other hand, the Thai and Chinese
governments did not provide such exclusive packages to SES
and GSZ.
In terms of currency exchange rate guarantees, if
private sectors need to take risks, they will need to
transfer those risks to the conditions in the BOT contracts,
such as the toll rate and the concession periods. In any
case, the government must take responsibility for currency
exchange risks. For example, Hopewell estimated a possible
15% annual depreciation of the Renminbi against the US dollar
in GSZ. Governments should consider whether exchange
guarantee costs are more expensive than the margins set by
private sectors.
In addition, security accounts were set for Shajiao C,
Pagbilao, and SES. The accounts are effective to assure
periodical payment from government for the usage of
electricity, and the trustee, in the case of Pagbilao, will
apply the proceeds to operation cost, tax, interest, and
principal due under the various financial documents.
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* Maintenance and operation risk
In the Chinese projects, the government promised
shortfall loans or guarantees for the operators'
performances. In addition, international operators were used
in Shajiao B during the first few years because of the
Chinese local labors' unfamiliarity with power plant
operation. However, the project company gradually reduced
the number of expatriates by educating local laborers to
reduce labor costs. International operators should be used
at least at the beginning of a project when the operation
requires special skills or is unfamiliar to local labors.
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4.5 Financial structure
I have compiled Table 4-7, 4-8 in order to analyze the
differences in financial structures among these seven
projects.
Table 4-7
Comparison of Financial Structures
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Shaliao B Shajiao C Navotas I Paqbilao
Cost (US$ 520 1,966 41 933
million)
Equity: 18 225 6.6 205
sponsors (US$
million)
Equity: share 18 150 (Joint 4.4 30
holders (US$ Venture
million) _ _ Partner)
Subordinated 0 841 0 0
loans (US$
million)
Bank syndicated 484 750 30 698
loans (US$
million)
Repayment 6.25 years 4 years 6-9 years 6-10 years
ccmmencing ccrmencing cammencing ccmnencing
9/1988 12/1996 12/1990 7/1997
Debt/Equity 13.44 0.62 2.73 2.97
Participation No No IFC, ADB, ADB IFC, ADB, CDC,
of MLA and ECA co-financing JEXIM, USEXIM,
IFC co-
financing
Fund raising Onshore and Onshore and Offshore Offshore
Offshore Offshore
Shortfall loans Yes - - -
Currency swap Interest rate - - Yes
_ sw ap .....
Table 4-8
Comparison of Financial Structures
Second Stage North-South Guangzhou-
Expressway Highway Shenzhen-
Zhuhai
Superhighway
Cost (US$ 1,100 2,296 1,206
million) (Originally
1,300)
Equity: 154 0 90 (Joint
sponsors (US$ Venture)
million)
Equity: share 66 296 (raised at -
holders (US$ the local stock
million) market)
440 (planned to
raise)
Subordinated 0 630 316
loans (US$
million)
Bank syndicated 880 926 800
loans (US$
million)
Debt/Equity 4.00 0.68 1.97
Participation ADB provided a No No
of MLA and ECA loan and equity
of US$ 40
million
Fund raising Onshore and Onshore and Onshore and
Offshore Offshore Offshore
Shortfall loans No -Yes, from both
Hopewell and
the government
agency
Currency swap -- -
* Debt and equity
The debt and equity ratios vary between 0.62 and 13.43
in power and 0.68 and 4.0 in road projects. An optimal
general debt equity ratio does not seem to exist because of
the differences in the conditions of each project. However,
each project's ratio suggests some important aspects of fund
raising in BOT.
For example, in power projects, the high ratio of
Shajiao B is the result of the willingness of the commercial
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bank, Citibank, to take advantage of the opportunity to
participate in the first BOT project for the huge Chinese
market (Augenblick and Custer, 1990). In Shajiao C, the
ratio is 0.62. The consensus among Hong Kong bankers was
that Hopewell could have achieved financing with a larger
ratio, but it would have taken longer than Hopewell wished.1
The ratios of the Philippines projects are moderate, but
Hopewell's Wu said that he needed equity partners of IFC and
ADB (and CDC) for the projects because he worried about the
Philippines track record in foreign trade (Tiong, 1992).
In road projects, the particularity of the NSH is the
raising of equity in the local stock market despite no equity
contribution from the sponsors. The well established stock
market and political stability made it feasible. The public
will be willing to invest in the stock if the project has the
potential to maximize their investments. The role of the
stock market will be important in raising funds and making
BOT feasible. Therefore, it is very important for developing
countries' governments to facilitate such stock markets.
With regard to GSZ, the total loan amount rose to US$
800 million which was a remarkable sum for the Hong Kong
market at the time, only 18 months after the Tiananmen
massacre. Hopewell's Wu's shrewd sense of what his bankers
require enabled such a loan. He constructed a strong
structure and assurance of the project with careful
documentation and even provided a balance sheet in support of
1 Pyle, Thomas H., "Case Studies of Chinese Power Generation; Shajiao B
and Shajiao C."
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his own company.' In addition, a shortfall loan was promised
by both Hopewell and the government agency. This shareholder
support is efficient in that it makes the project bankable.
Similar support is guaranteed at Hopewell's Pagbilao Power
Plant Project.
Strong sponsor track records in similar projects are
very important in raising loan funds from commercial banks.
The track records of Kumagai2 seemed to enable fund raising at
SES
Therefore, the participation of a specially interested
party for a project, required time for arranging loans,
participation of MLAs and ECAs, efficient use of the local
stock market, strong structure and assurance of the project
including the sponsors' financial support, and the project
company's and sponsor's reputations should be considered in
raising funds.
Offshore loans
All three projects use offshore loans. When the number
of BOT projects increases and profitability is assured,
foreign investors will be more willing to participate in
BOTs. However, I think government guarantees for the
currency exchange will be necessary to encourage such
1 Pyle, Thomas H., "The new jersey turnpike of China," Public Works
Financing, February 1994.
2 Kumagai completed other BOT projects such as the US$ 435 million
HongKong Eastern Harbor Crossing Project and the US$ 500 million
Sydney Harbor Tunnel Project.
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investments. Project companies will not be able to afford
the risk by themselves.
Traditionally, large offshore funds have been supplied
by Japanese commercial banks in Far East Asia. However, they
have become conservative because of the domestic economic
depression and the deficit from "bubble."
Participation of MLAs and ECAs
MLAs have actively participated in the Philippines power
projects. In addition, IFC has opened an office in Beijing
and its vice president said that they would provide US$ 600
million to help finance projects with a total cost of US$ 3
billion over the next three years; also the ADB says China's
concessional rate borrowings could be as much as US$ 1
billion per year.' For BOT developers, MLA's co-financing
program could be used as insurance against the country risk
that might be caused by nationalization and expropriation.
In that sense, Hopewell used the fund in the Philippines
projects. When Hopewell's Wu evaluated China for
constructing power plants, he knew there would be no problem
because China's track record in foreign trade is impressive.
However, with regard to the Philippines, he worried and got
ADB and IFC as equity partners (Tiong, 1992). Hopewell's Wu
said "I think there's only one country, maybe Peru, which
defaulted on World Bank loans" (Tiong, 1992). However, he is
going to work with IFC as a partner and arranger of funds for
1 Gray, Frank, "Doors opened to foreign investment," Financial Times 25
May 1993.
177
developing future power projects in China.1 Compared with
participation in power projects, only the ADB participated in
SES by providing equity and a loan of US$ 40 million.
Pagbilao is the first BOT project which JEXIM and USEXIM
have participated in. Their participation almost directly
relates to their own exporters' participation in the project.
Therefore, if the ECA participates in a BOT, that country's
exporters will find it very advantageous to supply the
materials and equipments that are needed. In any case, their
participation will be very important as the size and the
number of projects increase. At the same time, Especially,
regarding China, ECAs' financiers are extremely positive and
optimistic because of China's economic expansion and because
of its market size. ECAs' interest rates for China, around 5
percent, are well below the OECD consensus interest rates of
6.86 percent for secured projects.2
Although ECA has begun to finance power projects using
BOT, its attitude for highway projects might be different
because there would be less usage of heavy equipment and
materials. Therefore, it might be difficult to use such
funds for highway projects.
1 The China Business Review, "Guangdong's Rockefeller," January-February
1993.
2 Marks, John, "Financiers take the long view," Financial Times, 27
January 1994.
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Chapter V
Conclusion
By analyzing these projects, I discerned some critical
success factors on both the government and the private sides
for structuring future BOTs. These factors are summarized in
Table 5-1, and in the following description.
Table 5-1
Critical Success Factors in BOT
Government side Private sector side
All phases • Establishment of solid • Promotion of vital
legal structure project
. Appropriate project • Establishment of long
support term corporate strategy
* Government's joint • Standardization of the
venture partner's skill project design
up
Development • Contract award process • Usage of proven
phase • Responsibility for land technology
acquisition * Credit risk enhancement
Construction - Collaborative attitude • Good project management
phase • Good turnkey contract
Operation • Exchange rate guarantee * Efficient operation
phase strategy
Government side
* Establishment of a solid legal structure
A reliable legal structure is indispensable, because in
BOT, all of the liabilities are allocated to many parties,
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and their obligations are in contracts and agreements based
on the local law and regulations. The disastrous
expropriation of SES revealed that everything based on
immature legal backing is nonsense. Such an expropriation
could not have happened if the contracts and agreements had
been given the same importance as they are in developed
countries. It is critical for developing countries to
establish a solid legal backing to promote BOT.
Appropriate project support
It might be too early to predict whether these BOT
projects will be successful and how much government support
is sufficient for project companies. However, through my
research of these several projects, I have understood that
governmental support of "land acquisition" and "exchange rate
guarantee" will be essential for future BOTs. Without such
guarantees, the BOT promoter will have to insist upon a toll
rate increase and an extended concession period. These two
features should be guaranteed by governments. The
appropriate amount of governmental support will become clear
as similar projects are developed.
Government joint venture partner's skill up
In the case of joint venture between a government and
private sectors, a government partner should improve its
technical skills and attitude toward the project. If the
partner is incompetent as in the GSZ case, it will hamper the
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smooth execution of the project and the advantages of the
joint venture can easily be wiped out.
* Contract awarding process
Real competition in the bidding did not seem to exist in
all projects. It would require several million dollars to
investigate such huge projects seriously. Private companies
cannot afford to spend so much money and time without the
assurance of getting the contract. If the government wishes
to increase efficiency by encouraging real competition,
instead of extensive negotiation with a certain bidder for
these kinds of huge projects, it should provide some
financial assistance to developers to help them to
investigate the project. Also, as in the Malaysian road
project, the government may design a whole structure and set
the toll and call bids for concession periods. It seems that
simple competitive bidding cannot fit into the contract
awarding process in BOT. Therefore, in terms of the contract
awarding process, intensive negotiation with a preselected
BOT promoter is the only solution in the contract award
process.
* Collaborative attitude
The government agency or partner should be cooperative
to BOT developers. However, such agencies sometimes feel
that the foreign BOT promoter obstructs their territory. For
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example, EGAT1 demonstrated a tendency to jealously guard its
territory against newcomers (Ferrigno, 1993).2 In addition,
Hopewell's Wu said "The biggest opposition during the
negotiations for BOT is usually the host country authority.
Initially, they will say that they could do the job
themselves if they have the funds and that they could do just
good if not better than Hopewell or any private investor"
(Tiong, 1992). However, developing countries do not have
funds; they must hope for help from foreign investors.
Therefore, a positive atmosphere of mutual cooperation should
be encouraged. Such an atmosphere will improve working
relationships and accelerate the construction of sound
infrastructures.
Private sector side
Promote vital projects to obtain government support
It is very important to promote vital projects. The
government will support such needed projects, and this
support is critical for BOT projects in order for them to
progress smoothly. For example, all of the cases described
were well supported by governments because of the
understanding that the projects would be indispensable to
their economies and daily lives. Developing Asian countries'
governments are favorably adjusting their political and legal
systems toward BOTs. Furthermore, they are providing other
1 The Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand
2 It has announced ambitious expansion plans and an intention to involve
the private sector in generating plants. Yet the role of private
investors may be limited to minority ownership.
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supports such as equity or loan participation, guarantees for
changes in law and regulation, guarantees for force majeure,
tax privileges, right of way, minimum traffic guarantees, and
currency exchange and interest rate guarantees.
* Long term corporate strategy
In most cases, as far as a real competitive bidding does
not exist, one project success leads to the next project
opportunity. Therefore, a good track record is advantageous.
The BOT promoters should develop strong connections and
establish good project track records in targeted countries to
assure smooth progress for BOTs.
For example, Hopewell has strategically developed
smaller plants first in each country to learn the local
particularities. It established a good track record in those
pioneer projects, and bid on targeted projects. Their
strategy has worked well, because a certain amount of time is
required by host countries to understand the concept of BOT,
and mutual reliance between Hopewell and the government
should be established before constructing larger projects.
What is important is to select the project which will
permit them to achieve their strategic objectives and to
organize the proper teams to deal with the issues of the
projects. For example,- Hopewell developed Navotas I in order
to develop Pagbilao. In terms of its connection and
negotiation strategy, Hopewell's Wu said that it got a
special team to push through the bureaucracy at its Bangkok
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project (Tiong, 1992). Furthermore, BOT developers have to
develop their package structuring skills quickly. Learning
key points in BOT packaging is usually expensive.
* Standardization of the project
If there are many similar projects in the future like
the Chinese power plants, standardization of the power
plant's design should be considered in order to decrease
project costs and enhance the leaning curve.
* Usage of proven technology
New technology was not used in all projects. Even
though the risks were guaranteed by a lump-sum turnkey
contractor and the provision of liquidated damages was also
guaranteed by the contractor, the Don Muang highway project
was plainly a failure from every point of view. Promoters
should be careful in using new technologies because it is
essential to assure the cost, quality, and scheduling of the
construction.
* Credit risk enhancement
Low credit risks make it easier to raise equity capital
and loans for BOTs. Credit risks can be lowered by the usage
of MLA's co-financing program. Also, joint venture with the
low credit risk company or the usage of reliable contractor
consortium could improve the credit risk of the project.
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* Good project management
Because the concession period is 30 years for all three
projects, the quality of the highway is just as important as
its punctual construction schedule and cost control. Turnkey
is usually used for securing the management of cost and
scheduling, but it is critically important to select a
competent contractor that can control the entire project.
Also, quality control must be emphasized to minimize the-
maintenance cost.
* Good turnkey contract
It is especially important to select a reliable turnkey
contractor who can handle the high risks associated with the
construction stage. A poor selection could endanger the
project. In addition, a project developer should be prepared
for unexpected accidents, and reserve some adjustable time
and available funds. Hopewell's Wu said that he always tries
to finish his project one year earlier than the contracted
completion deadline.
* Efficient operation strategy
To secure proper operation, a reputed international
operator could be used at the beginning of the project,
especially in power projects. It could operate the plant
efficiently both from the physical and from the managerial
point of view. However, to reduce the labor costs, the
operator should gradually change the laborers from
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operator should gradually change the laborers from
expatriates to local laborers. On the other hand, when the
government agency operates the plant directly, some training
should be required to enhance operation and management
efficiency.
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